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Among the proliferating array of proposals for reforming the doctrine of the establishment clause, 1 the "no endorsement" test advocated by Justice O'Connor may seem the most promising. 2 Although
the Supreme Court has not yet accepted O'Connor's proposal in its
entirety, her essential proposition -that government should not endorse religion - has worked its way into several majority opinions, 3
portending possible adoption of the "no endorsement" test. To many
observers, this would evidently be a welcome development;
O'Connor's proposal has received the praise of numerous scholars
who believe that a "no endorsement" test could provide doctrinal clarity and consistency, or that the test captures, at least in important
part, the essential meaning of the establishment clause. 4
This article will argue that the "no endorsement" proposal does
indeed represent a significant development - but for a less auspicious
reason. Far from eliminating the inconsistencies and defects that have
plagued establishment analysis, the "no endorsement" test would introduce further ambiguities and analytical deficiencies into the doctrine. Moreover, the theoretical justifications offered for the test are
unpersuasive. Despite these drawbacks, the "no endorsement" test appeals to scholars and jurists because it expresses the direction in which
establishment doctrine and analysis seem to be drifting; the test represents a culmination of the venerable quest to define a position of governmental neutrality - and, recently, of "symbolic" neutrality towards religion. Thus, the "no endorsement" proposal is significant
not only because it may become the law but, perhaps as importantly,
1. For a recent effort to reduce the numerous competing viewpoints into a manageable set of
categories, see McConnell, You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY. 27 (1987).
2. Justice O'Connor's proposal is described in detail at notes 21-44 infra and accompanying
text.
3. Edwards v. Aguiflard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-79 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
4. For citations to academic commentary praising the "no endorsement" test, see note 45
infra.

268

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

because it provides a focal point for examining, and criticizing, the
prevailing doctrinal drift.
Section I of this article briefly describes the emergence and development of the "no endorsement" test. 5 Section II then seeks to show
that the test is deficient as doctrine, and thus incapable of providing
the clarity and coherence that current doctrine so sorely lacks. Section III considers various likely theoretical justifications for the "no
endorsement" proposal, including the justification advanced by Justice
O'Connor, and concludes that these justifications, like the test itself,
are seriously flawed. This conclusion provokes a question: If the "no
endorsement" test is doctrinally deficient and without theoretical justification, why has it elicited such widespread enthusiasm? Section IV
attempts to answer this question by depicting the "no endorsement"
test as an expression of the long-standing yearning to achieve governmental "neutrality" in matters of religion, and in particular of recent
proposals which seek to avoid past failures by focusing upon "symbolic" rather than actual or "substantive" neutrality.
To explain its appeal, however, is not to justify the test. Section V
of this article shows the futility of attempting to avoid contradiction
and incoherence by seeking neutrality in symbolism and perceptions.
The article concludes that the defects of the "no endorsement" test,
and of the jurisprudence of symbolism, manifest the emptiness of neutrality as a guide to church-state relations. The problem is not that the
concept of neutrality is false, meaningless, or inapplicable to establishment doctrine, but rather that the concept is purely formal and parasitic - and thus incapable of generating substantive solutions to
establishment problems. If the "no endorsement" test ultimately offers cause for hope, therefore, the hope is that the test's deficiencies,
once perceived, will prompt jurists and scholars to leave behind what
has proven to be a doctrinal dead end and tum their attention to exploring more promising avenues that may lead toward an adequate
establishment doctrine.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE

"No

ENDORSEMENT" TEST

The Supreme Court's modern efforts to give doctrinal content to
the establishment clause began in 1947; 6 but it was not until 1971 that
5. Because general descriptive overviews of the Supreme Court's modern establishment cases
are already abundant, the present essay will forbear to present another such overview. Readers
desiring useful general reviews of modern religion clause decisions may consult Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty i11 the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986); L. LEVY, THE EsTAD·
LISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-64 (1986).
6. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the Court settled upon the test that dominates current establishment
doctrine. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 7 the Court declared that in order to
survive an establishment challenge a law must meet three requirements: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " 8
Although the Lemon test has survived for over a decade and a half,
few have found the formulation satisfactory.9 One frequent criticism
asserts that decisions under the test have been chaotic; 10 commentators have been irresistibly drawn to "Alice in Wonderland" allusions.II Critics commonly intone what has become an almost
canonized litany of paired but manifestly inconsistent decisions purporting to apply the test. I2
In a similar vein, critics - and dissenting Justices - often insist
that the Court has distorted or misapplied the Lemon test in particular
cases. Such criticism reached a crescendo following Lynch v. Donnelly, 13 in which the Court, ostensibly applying the Lemon test, approved the use by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, of a creche in
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
9. Mark Tushnet notes that "virtually everyone who has thought about the religion clauses
... finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion clause issues unsatisfactory." Tushnet, Reflections on the Role ofPurpose i11 the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 997, 997 (1986).
10. See, e.g., McCoy & Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendmellt, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 252 (1986) (arguing that on a doctrinal level "the Court's various
approaches and results are impossible to reconcile"); Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: A11 Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 311, 315 (1986) (noting the "schizophrenic pattern of decisions"); Cornelius, Church and
State - The Mandate of the Establishmellt Clause: Wall ofSeparation or Benign Neutrality?, l 6
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 8 (1984) (asserting that observers are "virtually unanimous" in finding establishment decisions "inconsistent and unprincipled"); cf. L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 128 (establishment decisions "make distinctions that would glaze the minds of medieval scholastics");
Laycock, supra note 5, at 450 (arguing that the Lemon test is "so elastic in its application that it
means everything and nothing"); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendmellt and
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 846, 848 (1984) (establishment decisions
reflect "incantation of verbal formulae devoid of explanatory value").
11. See Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10
(1984) (establishment decisions seem "derived from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"); L.
LEVY, supra note 5, at 181 (establishment decisions seem to come from "a Humpty Dumpty
Court" which, as Humpty told Alice, thinks words can mean anything it says they mean); G.
GOLDBERG, RECONSECRATING AMERICA 75 (1984) (arguing that "Burger's opinion in Lemon
v. Kurtzman seems to have been written by the Mad Hatter").
12. See, e.g.. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 701-02 (1986); L.
LEVY, supra note 5, at 128-29, 162-63; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 316; Kurland, supra note 11, at
10-11; Cornelius, supra note 10, at 6-8.
13. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the city's Christmas display. The reaction to the decision reflects the
depth of discontent that has accumulated during the tenure of the
Lemon test. Two decades earlier, Professor Wilbur Katz had suggested that although a publicly sponsored nativity scene offended the
establishment clause, the offense could be excused under a de minimis
rationale. "If this means that our neutrality is a bit more neutral toward some than toward others," Katz calmly observed, "a sense of
humor should enable all of us to accept the situation .... " 14 Contemporary critics, by contrast, found nothing humorous in Lynch. Leo
Pfeffer compared Lynch to the Dred Scott decision. 15 Other commentators found the decision "devastating to first amendment doctrine," 16
"disingenuous" and "sleazy," 17 "wholly unprincipled and indefensible,"18 and "a paradigmatic disregard of the establishment clause in
virtually every dimension of its concerns." 19
Like the critics, Justice O'Connor was evidently troubled by the
Court's reasoning in Lynch. Although joining in the majority opinion,
she attempted to place the decision on a firmer footing by proposing,
in a separate opinion, a "clarification" of the Lemon test. Her proposal focuses on the factor of governmental "endorsement" of religion. 20
In O'Connor's approach, the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test
would mean that government may not act with the intent of endorsing,
or disapproving of, religion. Lemon's requirement of a primarily secu14. W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 23-24 (1964).
15. L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 124 (1984). Pfeffer argued
that both decisions were "predicated upon the same basic concept: the inherent inferiority of
ethnic groups, either because of color of skin or religious commitment." Id.
16. Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 Mo. L.
REV. 352, 353 (1986).
17. Kurland, supra note 11, at 12-13.
18. Laycock, Equal Access and Moments ofSilence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 8 (1986).
19. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall -A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 781. For additional harsh reaction to the
decision, see, e.g., Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22 (1986) (Lynch "marked the greatest incursion to date on the separation
of church and state"); Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 837; Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985). Mark Tushnet concludes that just as compatibility with Brown
v. Board of Education is a criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory, "a criterion for an
acceptable theory of the religion clauses is whether that theory explains why the Court's decision
in Lynch was wrong." Tushnet, supra note 9, at 999 n.4.
20. O'Connor's choice of the creche case to announce this "endorsement" rationale seems
ironic; opponents of the decision might well reply that far from rationalizing the result, an "endorsement" analysis in fact identifies precisely what was objectionable in the case. The creche,
after all, provided little or no material assistance to religion, but it did "endorse" Christianity, or
at least create perceptions of endorsement. See note 132 infra. Thus, the circumstances of the
test's own nativity did not bode well for its prospects of rescuing establishment doctrine from
confusion and incoherence.
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lar effect would be modified to mean that laws or governmental practices are invalid if they create a perception that government is
endorsing or disapproving of religion. 21 A law which avoids creating a
perception of endorsement could be sustained even though "it in fact
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion."22 Conversely, a law which appears to endorse religion would
presumably be unconstitutional even though religion in reality derived
no significant benefit from the law.
Justice O'Connor's Lynch opinion offered two justifications for the
"no endorsement" test. One was practical in character; the "no endorsement" test, O'Connor contended, "clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical device." 23 The other justification was more theoretical.
O'Connor started from the fundamental premise that "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." 24 She then argued that government might transgress
that prohibition either by "excessive entanglement with religious institutions" or by endorsing or disapproving of religion. "Endorsement,"
she explained, "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." 25
In later cases, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed and elaborated upon
the "no endorsement" proposal. In Wallace v. Jajfree, 26 the Court
struck down, for want of a secular legislative purpose, an Alabama
statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer." Concurring, O'Connor again offered her
"no endorsement" proposal as a "refinement" of the Lemon test, and
reiterated both the practical and theoretical justifications for that proposal. 27 She agreed that the "moment of silence" law was unconstitu21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor indicated that she
would also preserve the prohibition against excessive institutional entanglement between government and religion, but would not regard political divisiveness as evidence of entanglement. 465
U.S. at 689.
22. 465 U.S. at 691-92.
23. 465 U.S. at 689.
24. 465 U.S. at 687.
25. 465 U.S. at 687-88.
26. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
27. O'Connor again argued that "[t]he endorsement test is useful because of the analytic
content it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect." Wallace, 472
U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She also restated her contention that the establishment
clause prohibits government from making religion relevant to political standing and that endorsement violates this principle by making nonadherents feel like "outsiders, not full members
of the political community." 472 U.S. at 69."
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tional because, in her view, the law had been intended and would be
perceived_ as an endorsement of prayer, thereby violating both prongs
of the "no endorsement" test. 28
O'Connor's Wallace opinion also gave further analytical content to
the "no endorsement" test. She emphasized that the review of legislative intent under the test's first prong should be "deferential and limited."29 She also elaborated upon the "perception" prong; contrary to
her language in Lynch, which had suggested that the relevant perceptions were those of real human beings who are the recipients of
messages from government, 30 O'Connor now made clear that the dispositive question is whether the law would be perceived as endorsement by an "objective observer" who is familiar with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the law in question. 31 In
addition, the "objective observer" should be understood to be familiar
with the values recognized in the free exercise clause. 32 This qualification represents an attempt to justify limited government accommodation of religion, and to escape the oft-noted tension between the free
exercise and establishment clauses. Government sometimes confers
special privileges upon some persons because of their religious beliefs.
Some privileges, such as the right to receive unemployment compensation while refusing for religious reasons to work on Saturdays, may
even be required by the free exercise clause. 33 If similar privileges are
denied to nonbelievers, an untutored observer might well perceive the
conferral of such special privileges as an endorsement of religion and
thus, under O'Connor's test, as a violation of the establishment clause.
Justice O'Connor's more sophisticated "objective observer," however,
would draw no such conclusion, but instead would understand that
the privilege was intended to further free exercise values. 34
This qualification of the "no endorsement" principle was underscored in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 35 a decision striking down
a Connecticut statute requiring employers to excuse employees from
28. 472 U.S. at 67, 77-79.
29. 472 U.S. at 74-75.
30. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. 472 U.S. at 83.
33. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn., 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Thomas v. Re·
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Whether this qualification of the "no
endorsement" test actually does anything to resolve the conflict between the clauses is questiona·
ble. If the free exercise clause requires government to confer special privileges upon religious
believers, then one might conclude that the free exercise clause itself endorses religion and
thereby offends what, according to O'Connor, is a principal concern of the establishment clause.
35. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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work on whatever day of the week employees might regard as their
Sabbath. Justice O'Connor concurred because she believed that the
unqualified accommodation required by the statute would be perceived as an endorsement of religion. 36 However, she asserted that
analogous federal accommodation provisions in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 37 requiring employers to make "reasonable" efforts to accommodate employees' religious beliefs, are not unconstitutional. Because the duty to accommodate is not absolute, an
"objective observer" would perceive Title VII's requirement not as endorsing religion, but merely as furthering free exercise values. 38
More recently, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 39 Justice O'Connor again
enlisted the "objective observer" to justify an accommodation of religion. The question in Amos was whether amended section 702 of the
Civil Rights Act, 40 which exempts religious organizations from the
prohibition against employment discrimination, unconstitutionally advances, or discriminates in favor of, religion. Upholding the exemption, the Court distinguished between cases in which "the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence"
and cases in which government merely "allows churches to advance
religion."41 The exemption from employment discrimination laws fell
into the latter category, and was therefore permissible. Justice
O'Connor found this distinction untenable, but concurred in the judgment on the basis of her "no endorsement" rationale. 42 She recognized that the exemption for religious organizations "does have the
effect of advancing religion," but nonetheless concluded that with respect to nonprofit religious organizations "the objective observer
should perceive the government action as an accommodation of the
exercise of religion rather than as a government endorsement of religion."43 O'Connor implied without actually deciding, however,. that
the exemption may be invalid if applied to profitmaking religious
organizations. 44
36. 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
38. 472 U.S. at 711-12.
39. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1982).
41. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2868-69 (emphasis in original).
42. 107 S. Ct. at 2874-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. 107 S. Ct. at 2874-75 (emphasis in original).
44. 107 S. Ct. at 2875. In terms of her own test, O'Connor's decision to distinguish between
nonprofit and profitmaking organizations, and to reserve the question of whether profitmaking
organizations can be exempted, seems questionable. Although Amos involved a nonprofit organization - the Latter-Day Saints-operated Deseret Gymnasium - the statutory exemption itself
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Thus, after initially proposing the "no endorsement" test in Lynch,
Justice O'Connor has continued to advocate and refine the test. Her
efforts seem to be having an effect. Numerous academic commentators have written approvingly of the test. 45 Lower courts have begun
is not expressly limited to nonprofit organizations; it extends, without express limitation, to "a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1982). It would seem that an astute "objective observer," charged with determining whether the
statute communicates a message of endorsement, might consider the statute as written and
adopted by Congress. Justice O'Connor did not explain why the observer, rather than reading
the statute, would look only to the statute's effect in a particular case.
45. Several full-length analyses of Justice O'Connor's proposal, while occasionally doubtful
about particular aspects of her formulation such as the "objective observer" standard, see note
106 infra, have been highly favorable toward her approach generally. See Beschle, The Co11sena-

tive as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishmem Clause: The U11tapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986); Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modification of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465; see also
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 495 (1986).
Other commentators have praised O'Connor's proposal in passing, but with less extensive
discussion. See Note, Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1607, 1647 (1987) (O'Connor's "reformulation properly suggests that establishment clause inquiry should focus on the impact of state actions on nonadherents of benefitted creeds, lest the
state place a 'badge of inferiority' on these citizens because of their beliefs") (quoting Loewy,
supra, at 1051 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896))) [hereinafter Harvard
Note]; Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Stall/le,
96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1160 (1987) ("no endorsement" approach "provides a standard capable of
consistent application and avoids the criticism levelled against the Lemon test"); Dellinger, The
Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitution, 95 YALE L.J. 1631, 1638 (1986)
(describing O'Connor's proposal as a "promising approach"); Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle
in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. l, 55 (approving O'Connor's view that avoiding endorsement is "the most important goal"); L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 155-56 (describing O'Connor's
Wallace concurrence as "splendidly analytical" and an "excellent opinion"); Smith, Now is the
Time for Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and Its Legislative Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REV. 345, 367
(1986) (describing O'Connor's Wallace opinion as "thoughtful and candid"); Paulsen, supra
note 10, at 352 (O'Connor's proposal "has put the best light to date" on Lemon test); Tribe,
Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sie1•e, 36 H1\STINGS
L.J. 155, 162 (1984) ("Justice O'Connor at least asked the right question in Lynch. She asked
whether nonadherents are sent a message by these practices that they are 'outsiders, not full
members of the political community?' "); Lacey, The Struggle Over Deregulation of ReligiouslyAffiliated Institutions: A Classic Internal First Amendment Conflict, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 65157 (1984) (arguing for prohibition of "symbolic aid to religion" and quoting O'Connor's proposal
with approval); cf Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim Abol/f Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 922 (1986) (indicating that government should not be
allowed "to endorse or prefer one religious faith over others"); McCoy & Kurtz, supra note 10, at
257 (official endorsement of religion should be a " 'per se' violation of the establishment clause"):
Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 739, 746 n.30 (1986) (advocating, consistent with ••no endorsement" idea, elimination of
"all references to God in public life"); Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creation-

ism": Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Sii/dents' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 373 (1986) (advocating "no endorsement" test for public education
issues).
It would be truly miraculous, of course, if all academic commentators were enthusiastic
about the "no endorsement" proposal; and not all are. See, e.g.. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 71112. Moreover, many scholars who approve of the proposal disagree with O'Connor's application
of the test in particular cases, such as Lynch. See, e.g., Tribe, supra, at 162.
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to treat the proposed prohibition on endorsement as established law. 46
And Supreme Court majority opinions have invoked the "no endorsement" idea with approval. Recently, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 47 the
Supreme Court quoted from O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, and invalidated a Louisiana statute requiring "balanced treatment" of evolution and creationism in public schools because "the primary purpose
of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine." 4 8
These approving references by the Supreme Court do not yet
amount to outright adoption of the "no endorsement" test. The Court
seems disposed to accept the expansive implications of the test, and
thus to employ "endorsement" as an additional ground for finding an
impermissible purpose or effect in a challenged law. However, the
Court has not yet accepted the restrictive implications of the test; 49 it
has not confirmed, for instance, that a law which does not endorse
religion may be upheld even if "it in fact causes, even as a primary
effect, advancement or inhibition ofreligion." 50 And while some opinions, particularly those written by Justice Brennan, refer to endorsement,51 others make no mention of it. Thus, despite O'Connor's
contention in Amos that the endorsement rationale offers the most
plausible justification for Title VII's exemption for religious organizations, the majority opinion, written by Justice White, appears studiously to avoid relying upon, or even alluding to, that rationale. 52
At present, therefore, the Court treats the "no endorsement" test
as an occasional supplement to the reigning Lemon test, but not as a
successor to, or even a definitive refinement of, that test. However,
46. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563
(6th Cir. 1986) (invoking "no endorsement" test to invalidate city's placement of creche), cert.
de11ied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (ruling that state may not assign only male drivers to school buses transporting Hasidic
children because this "would undoubtedly be seen as a symbolic union of church and state,
conveying a message of state support for the Hasidic religion").
47. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
48. 107 S. Ct. at 2583. See also Witters v. Washington Dept. ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488-89 (1986) (citing O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence with approval); Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (describing prevention of endorsement as "a core purpose
of the Establishment Clause," with citation to O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985) (quoting O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence with approval).
49. Thus, in Edwards, Gra11d Rapids School Dist., and Wallace, majority opinions have invoked a prohibition against endorsement in holding laws u11co11stitutio11a/. Except for a brief
allusion to endorsement in Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89, the majority has not used the endorsement rationale, as O'Connor did in Ly11ch and Amos, to uphold a law or practice.
50. Ly11ch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Brennan wrote the majority opinions in Edwards and Gra11d Rapids School Dist. He also
employed an endorsement analysis in his dissenting opinion in Ly11ch. 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
52. See Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2867-70.
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this situation could well be transitional. If dissatisfaction with Lemon
does not abate - and there is no indication that it will - O'Connor's
"no endorsement" test seems at the moment to be the heir apparent.
By offering her proposal as a "clarification" of the Lemon test,
O'Connor has facilitated a smooth transition to the "no endorsement"
approach.
Before its formal acceptance, however, the "no endorsement" test
deserves more careful scrutiny than it has received thus far. Such
scrutiny reveals serious problems, both theoretical and practical, with
O'Connor's proposal.

II.

FLAWED DOCTRINE: ANALYTICAL DEFECTS IN THE
ENDORSEMENT" TEST

"No

Postponing consideration of the underlying theoretical justifications offered for the "no endorsement" test, the present section focuses
upon Justice O'Connor's more practical justification for the test, i.e.,
her contention that the test is valuable because it "clarifies"SJ and
gives "analytic content" 54 to the Lemon test. The "no endorsement"
test embodies four important doctrinal terms or concepts: endorsement, intent, perception, and religion. The following analysis seeks to
show that each of those concepts would create serious difficulties in
application - difficulties that would only serve to aggravate existing
doctrinal confusion.
A.

Endorsement

Although the central concept in Justice O'Connor's test - "endorsement" - may at first glance seem straightforward, this appearance is misleading. Endorsement connotes approval; but approval
may take various forms, and it is far from certain that O'Connor's test
is intended, or can sensibly be understood, to prohibit all forms of
governmental approval of religion. Upon examination, therefore, the
concept of endorsement seems both elusive and elastic.
1.

The Varieties of Religious Endorsement

Consider, for instance, the following varieties of approval or
endorsement.
(1) Historically, proponents of different faiths have often assumed
that since religions differ in their doctrines, practices, and claims to
53. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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divine authority, not all of them could be correct; 55 among diverse
religions, rather, only one could fully enjoy God's favor and approval.
Thus, disputes have raged over the issue of which religion is true or
divinely preferred. If government took a position in a sectarian dispute56 by indicating that it accepted a particular religion as the true or
divinely sanctioned faith, it would thereby endorse or approve that
religion. This form of approval might be described as "exclusive
preferment."
(2) Government might express a judgment that important doctrines of a religion are true without indicating that it believes the religion is exclusively true or divinely preferred. This form of approval
might be described as an "endorsement of truthfulness."
(3) Without indicating any view on the truthfulness of religious
doctrine, government might express a judgment that a religion, or religion generally, is va1uable or good by suggesting, perhaps, that religiqn
instills qualities of good citizenship or helps to maintain civil peace.
(4) Without indicating any view either as to religion's truthfulness
or as to its value to society generally, government might acknowledge
that many individual citizens care deeply about religion and that the
religious concerns of such citizens merit respect and accommodation
by government. This limited form of implicit approval or support57
might be described as "accommodation endorsement."
Though not exhaustive, this list shows that the concept of "endorsement" may be understood in various senses. Intuitively, exclusive preferment seems the strongest form of endorsement and,
presumably, the form most offensive to Justice O'Connor's test. At
the other extreme, when one considers endorsements of value or accommodation endorsements, the issue is less clear. Except for her suggestion that some accommodations of religion should be permitted,58
however, O'Connor has failed to specify which senses of endorsement
55. See s. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 476 (1972)
{describing "willingness of converts [to American sects] to regard anyone who opposed or
doubted them as perdition-bound").
56. See S. MEAD, THE OLD RELIGION IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 10 {1977) ("Sectarianism is the claim of a group exclusively to be the church of Christ on earth and the only ark of
salvation. A sectarian is one who makes this claim for his species, or sub-species, of Christianity.") (emphasis in original).
57. Supporters of a "no endorsement" test, including Justice O'Connor, sometimes treat accommodation as if it were not a form of endorsement at all. See note 70 infra and accompanying
text. But since not all citizen concerns are accommodated, accommodation of religion does reflect at least limited approval. Cf Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept i11 Co11stitutio11al Law. 72
CALIF. L. REV. 753, 797 (1984) (observing that "the purpose to accommodate religion is often
not very different from the purpose to promote religion").
58. See text at notes 32-43 supra.
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fall within her test's prohibition. As currently formulated, therefore,
the test threatens to aggravate existing doctrinal confusion.
2.

Can the Concept Be Clarified?

The foregoing criticism seemingly might be deflected by a refinement of the test; proponents might simply specify more precisely
which forms of endorsement are included in the test's prohibition and
which, if any, are not. But an examination of alternative constructions
that might seek to refine the test shows that an attempt to specify the
meaning of endorsement would create further difficulties.
a. A blanket prohibition. On the surface, the simplest way to
achieve clarity would be to insist that all forms of endorsement are
prohibited. Thus, even governmental actions or messages which recognize that religion has value, or which attempt to respect and accommodate the religious concerns of citizens, would be forbidden. But a
sweeping prohibition applicable even to governmental accommodation
of religion would force government to ignore religion and to disregard
religion's distinctive interests and needs. The only permissible attitude
for government to take with respect to religion, in other words, would
be one of studied indifference. At the very least, this construction of
the test would deviate from the prevailing view that the establishment
clause does not demand "callous indifference" toward religion. 59
Moreover, in a polity in which government regularly acknowledges
and accommodates citizen interests of various sorts, deliberate indifference toward one class of interests may easily shade into, and become indistinguishable from, disapproval 60 which Justice
O'Connor's test would also forbid.
If not all kinds of endorsement are to be prohibited, however, then
proponents of a "no endorsement" test must explain how to distinguish between particular forms of endorsement which are permissible
and other forms which are not. Such a distinction, moreover, should
not be merely arbitrary; it should be supported by an explanation that
tells why some but not other kinds of endorsement amount to a consti59. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2868 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). See also
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Intuition tells us that some official 'acknowl·
edgement' is inevitable in a religious society if government is not to adopt a stilted indifference to
the religious life of the people.").
60. Justice Goldberg, while voting to invalidate prayer and Bible reading in public schools,
long ago noted the possibility that an overly rigid pursuit of neutrality could lead to "a brooding
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious."
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cj
Cornelius, supra note 10, at 36 (asserting that "government cannot be truly neutral in religious
matters unless it recognizes and reasonably accommodates the religious traditions and practices
of our people").
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tutional evil. Possible explanations for the "no endorsement" idea will
be considered later. 61 But the practical difficulty may be noted here:
Even if a distinction between permissible and impermissible forms of
endorsement were articulated and justified on a conceptual level, application problems of the most vexing sort would nonetheless remain.
b. Exempting accommodation. Suppose, for instance, that proponents of the test adopt an "accommodation only" construction of the
test, i.e., one which permits governmental accommodation of religion
but forbids all other forms of endorsement, including exclusive preferment and endorsements of truthfulness or value. This qualification
seems consistent with what Justice O'Connor has suggested concerning the permissibility of accommodation. Unfortunately, the line separating accommodation endorsements from endorsements of
truthfulness or value is so thin as to be virtually invisible. As a result,
an "accommodation only" construction, in practice, must either collapse back into a fiat ban on all endorsements, or else it must expand
to permit endorsements of truthfulness and value.
An "accommodation only" construction implies that legislators
may adopt measures assisting religion so long as the legislators are
acting out of concern for the religious convictions of their constituents,
the citizens of the nation or the state. On the other hand, if legislators
adopt a similar measure that assists religion because they (the legislators) believe that religion is true or beneficial, they will probably be
perceived as making - and, depending upon how the test's "intent"
prong is understood, may be deemed to have intended62 - an endorsement of truthfulness or value. Such an endorsement would violate the
"accommodation only" construction of the test. Thus, the constitutionality of a measure helpful to religion would depend upon whether
the legislators acted - and were perceived as having acted - because
they believe in religion (in which case the measure would probably be
considered an invalid endorsement), or because they believe their constituents believe in religion (in which case the measure would be a permissible accommodation).
Beyond creating obvious problems in ascertaining legislative intent, 63 such a construction places inordinate weight upon a supposed
61. See sections III & IV.A i11fra.
62. Questions about the meaning of "intent" are considered in section II.B infra. However,
the Wallace decision constitutes powerful evidence for a conclusion that already seems intuitively
persuasive: In practice, if legislators known to hold strong religious beliefs pass laws accommodating those religious beliefs and related practices, the legislators will be deemed to have intended
to endorse religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985).
63. The problems inherent in ascertaining legislative intent are considered in section II.B
i11fra.
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distinction that may not even be conceptually viable. In a representative democracy, legislators and citizens are not distinct and separate
categories of persons. Legislators are themselves citizens, whose own
interests and beliefs are presumably entitled to be counted. 64 Even
more importantly, legislators are commonly thought to be capable of
representing their constituents because they share their constituents'
beliefs and values. 65 Thus, the legislators' beliefs and the constituents'
beliefs should often coincide. But if a legislator is viewed in this way
as a "representative," i.e., as one who can speak for the citizens because her beliefs and interests are "representative" of theirs, then the
question of whether the legislator has acted on the basis of her own
beliefs or those of the citizens seems meaningless: It is precisely by
acting upon her own beliefs that the legislator "represents" the beliefs
and interests of her constituents.
Thus, in attempting to clarify the "no endorsement" test by recognizing an "accommodation only" exception, proponents of the test
would culminate by making a measure's constitutionality turn upon a
distinction which may be nonsensical, and which in any event is not a
distinction that courts can be expected to make with any degree of
accuracy. 66 Proponents of the "no endorsement" test might try to
tame this intractable distinction by adopting a "bright line" construction, either permissive or restrictive, of the accommodation exception.
Under the permissive construction, laws adopted to accommodate citizens' religious interests and beliefs would be upheld, even though the
legislators may have shared and approved such interests and beliefs.
In other words, a genuine purpose of accommodation would serve to
legitimate laws even though the legislators, in adopting such laws,
have also approved the truthfulness or value of religious beliefs. Such
a construction effectively abandons the "accommodation only" version of the "no endorsement" test, and offers government a broad Ii64. But cf Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1075 (1986)
(arguing that government officials should not act upon religious reasons in discharging their
public duties even though other citizens are free to do so).
65. Conceptions of representation are diverse, but the view that "representation means accu·
rate resemblance," Pitkin, The Concept ofReprese11tatio11, in REPRESENTATION I I (H. Pitkin ed.
1969), is common and intuitively appealing. Hanna Pitkin explains that this conception of repre·
sentation is consistent with a position in which "[r]epresentative government is seen as a next·
best substitute for direct democracy, but a substitute that needs justification. One way to justify
it is to argue that the representative legislature so closely resembles the whole nation, that its
actions are the same as what the nation would do." Id. John Adams expressed this view when
he argued (contrary to the Burkean notion of representatives as trustees, which the conservative
Adams might be expected to have adopted) that a legislature "should be an exact portrait, in
miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them." Letter from
John Adams to John Penn, quoted ill H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60 (1967).
66. Cf Beschle, supra note 45, at I 74 {idea of accommodation "provides no basis for devel·
oping a clear set of,standards").
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cense to support religion under the guise of "accommodation. " 67
At the opposite extreme, under a restrictive construction of the
accommodation exception, any law which reflects approval of religious beliefs held by legislators would be deemed invalid, even when
the law also serves to accommodate the religious beliefs of citizens.
Under this construction, laws passed by religious legislators would be
invalidated as impermissible endorsements of religion even though the
same laws might be upheld if enacted by neutrally agnostic legislators
conscientiously representing a religious constituency. Thus, religious
legislators - or, for that matter, anti-religious legislators - would in
effect be subject to a special disability because of their adherence or
opposition to religious beliefs. This special disability would significantly burden the freedom of belief and expression of legislators - as
well as penalizing their constituents. 68 In practice, moreover, this construction would be virtually equivalent to a flat ban on accommodation, 69 and would be subject to the same criticisms.
These difficulties point to the essential flaw in the "accommodation
only" construction of the "no endorsement" test: The construction
tacitly assumes a spurious dichotomy in which "accommodation" and
"endorsement" are treated as mutually exclusive alternatives. 7° From
this assumed dichotomy, it follows that if a measure can be viewed as
an "accommodation" of religion, it is not an "endorsement" of reli67. Cf Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1638 ("The inevitable tendency of accommodationism as it is currently practiced - on an ad hoc, unprincipled basis - is towards religious favoritism, overt or covert, of mainstream religions ....").
68. Wallace v. Jajfree illustrates this danger. The decision suggests that laws authorizing a
moment of silence in public schools - a moment which students may use for reflection or prayer
- will often be constitutional. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985) (majority opinion); 472
U.S. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); 472 U.S. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, if
evidence indicates that the legislators hoped that students would use the moment of silence for
prayer, then an impermissible intent to endorse will be found. The result makes it difficult to
escape the conclusion that in such matters the Court has imposed a special disability upon legislators who entertain and express religious beliefs and aspirations, as well as upon the constituents
of those legislators. Cf Laycock, supra note 18, at 23 ("If ... evidence [of religious motivation]
renders the Equal Access Act constitutionally suspect, then religious citizens are effectively deprived of their right to participate in the political process.").
69. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. I, 47 ("Legislative history in an accommodation case is quite likely to reveal that the legislators who cared enough to
sponsor the legislation were those who approved of the religious practice in question.").
70. Justice O'Connor does not, and likely would not, expressly assert the validity of such a
dichotomy. Nonetheless, her discussions of accommodation often make sense only if such a dichotomy is presupposed. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting
that "the objective observer should perceive the [statutory exemption] ... as an accommodation
of the exercise of religion rather than as a government endorsement of religion") (emphasis added); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I
believe an objective observer would perceive [Title VIl's reasonable accommodation requirement] ... as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion") (emphasis
added).
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gion; thus "endorsement" can serve as a limit upon "accommodation," and vice versa. But this either/or depiction is badly misleading.
Far from being mutually exclusive, "accommodation" and "endorsement" of religion are much more likely to coincide. 71 Asking whether
a law beneficial to religion is an "endorsement" or an "accommodation," therefore, is no more sensible than asking whether a lemon is
yellow or sour; the answer in each case is, "Both.'' Hence, the concept
of "accommodation" can provide no coherent or workable limits on
the kinds of endorsement that are permissible. 72
c. Exempting endorsements of value. The foregoing analysis suggests the unworkability of a construction of the "no endorsement" test
which would permit governmental accommodation of religion while
forbidding exclusive preferment and endorsements of truthfulness or
value. But similar problems of application would afflict other possible
constructions of the test. Suppose, for instance, that the "no endorsement" test were construed to permit not only accommodation but also
endorsements of value, while continuing to prohibit endorsements of
truthfulness. The dispositive distinction would then be between approving a faith's truthfulness and merely approving its value; government would be permitted to say that religion is "good" but not that
religion is "true."
But there is no reliable way for a court to determine whether
school prayer, or aid to parochial schools, or publicly sponsored nativity scenes, indicate that the religious ideas or causes they represent are
"true" or merely that such ideas or causes are "good." Once again,
the distinction may not even be conceptually coherent: Pragmatist
philosophy denies the distinction between an idea's value and its truthfulness. 73 Thus, a "no endorsement" test which attempted to draw the
line between endorsements of truthfulness and endorsements of value
would be conceptually questionable and unmanageable in practice.
d. Exempting endorsements of truthfulness. The remaining alternative would be to prohibit only exclusive preferment, but to permit
not only accommodation and endorsements of value but also endorse71. See McConnell, supra note 69, at 47.
72. This does not mean that the concept of "accommodation" itself has no value; the courts
might develop independent restrictions limiting such accommodation. See McConnell, supra note
69, at 35-37 (suggesting guidelines for permissible accommodation). The point is simply that
"accommodation" is not useful for limiting the scope of permissible "endorsement," and that the
idea of "endorsement" is not useful for limiting "accommodation."
73. William James maintained that "truth is one species ofgood .... The true is the name of
whatever proves itself to be good i111he way ofbelief ...." W. JAMF.S, PRAGMATISM 75-76 (1947)
(emphasis in original). Thus, James held that "[i]f theological ideas prove to have a value for
concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, ill the sense of being good for so much." Id. at 73
(emphasis in original).
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ments of truthfulness. Under this construction of the test, government
could give both material assistance and explicit praise to religion so
long as it did not express a belief that any particular religion is the
religion preferred by providence or the state. By contrast to other constructions that attempt to distinguish between permissible and impermissible forms of endorsement, this construction might well be
manageable in practice. The problem is that it prohibits too little, and
is therefore unlikely to appeal to supporters of a ."no endorsement"
test. 74
In sum, the central concept in Justice O'Connor's test - the concept of "endorsement" - is the source of serious and seemingly irresolvable ambiguities. 75 The test cannot sensibly be understood to
prohibit every form of governmental approval of religion. But every
attempt to refine the test by specifying that only particular kinds of
endorsement are forbidden results in distinctions that are conceptually
dubious and practically unworkable.
B. Intent to Endorse

Even if the meaning of endorsement could be adequately clarified,
the question of whether government officials "intend" to endorse religion would present difficulties. Some of these are difficulties that inhere in any constitutional "intent" inquiry, while others specially
affiict the "no endorsement" test.
74. This narrow construction of the test would reduce its scope even beyond that of the "no
preference" test favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by scholars such as Robert Cord. According to "no preference" advocates, the establishment clause forbids two evils: creation of a
state or national church, and discrimination among religions. See, e.g., Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY. 129 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). An
"exclusive preferment" construction of the "no endorsement" test would also forbid the first of
these evils. But it would not necessarily preclude aid to religion which in fact benefits some
religions more than others, so long as such aid did not represent that the state regards a particular religion as the true or divinely preferred church.
75. The uncertain meaning and scope of "endorsement" are apparent in Professor Arnold
Loewy's discussion of whether the "no endorsement" test would permit public schools and universities to let student religious groups conduct activities using campus facilities on the same
basis as other student groups. Loewy first observes that the question is a difficult one because
such cases "require the school either to endorse or to disapprove religion." Loewy, supra note
45, at 1061. One page later, however, Loewy notes that allowing student religious groups to meet
would be a less objectionable form of endorsement since the school would merely be acting in
accordance with a neutral "open forum" policy. Id. at 1062. On the following page, Loewy
concludes that "[m]erely providing a forum has never been thought to endorse the ideas conveyed therein." Id. at 1063. Thus, within three pages, Loewy appears to use the concept of "endorsement" in at least two and possibly three different senses, with shifting implications for a
practice's constitutional validity. The blame for such vagarious usage is not primarily Professor
Loewy's, but simply reflects the critical ambiguities within the concept of endorsement itself.
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The Standard Problems

In the past, the Supreme Court has been understandably reluctant
to authorize judicial inquiries into governmental intent. 76 On a purely
factual level, inquiries into the intent of governmental officials are inherently treacherous; indeed, when the governmental body in question
is a legislature composed of many members with complex and conflicting motives and aims, it is difficult to say whether such an inquiry is
even meaningful. 77 Moreover, by making intent dispositive of a measure's constitutionality, the Supreme Court would create powerful incentives for government officials to dissemble or disguise their motives.
Finally, a court undertaking a motive inquiry risks showing disrespect
for the officials of other bodies or branches of government. 78
Justice O'Connor's test specifically focuses on the question of intent to endorse, 79 and thereby encounters all of the difficulties inherent
in such an approach. Those difficulties are conspicuous in Wallace v.
Jaffree, the "moment of silence" case, and in Edwards v. Aguillard, the
"creationism" case. In Wallace, both the Court and O'Connor concluded that the "moment of silence" statute was intended to endorse
school prayer. Although that conclusion does not seem implausible,
the reasons given for the conclusion are nonetheless troubling. The
majority relied heavily upon two items of evidence: post-enactment
statements by the sponsor of the "moment of silence" law, State Senator Donald Holmes, and the context and background of the law. 80
The first kind of evidence attributed to the legislature as a whole an
intent based upon post hoc statements of a single legislator, thus un76. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 383-85 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810). Under the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, however, the Court does occasionally look to intent in
determining the constitutionality oflaws or practices. E.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
77. For an insightful discussion of some of the conceptual difficulties, see R. DWORKIN, A
MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 18-23 (1985).
78. In many decisions under the Lemon test, the Court has been able to avoid these difficulties by focusing not on intent but on purpose, and by requiring a secular purpose rather thnn
forbidding a religious purpose. As a result, if a plausible secular reason for a challenged measure
can be advanced, the Court can avoid probing the psyches of government officials. Thus, in mnny
cases considering aid to parochial schools, the Court has found a secular purpose with little
effort. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) ("Under our prior decisions, governmental assistance programs have consistently survived this [secular-purpose] inquiry even when
they have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon framework.").
79. Justice O'Connor talks about both "purpose" and "intent," often seeming to use the
terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985). The reason for this
usage lies in O'Connor's view that her test is a "clarification" of the Lemon test, as a result of
which her arguments may sometimes move back and forth between the original test and her own
"refinement" of it. As refined, however, "purpose" for O'Connor evidently means "intent."
80. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-60.
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derscoring the factual and conceptual problems of ascertaining the intent of a collective body. O'Connor found the use of such evidence
"particularly troublesome." 81 However, she was more impressed by
the Court's argument that since Alabama law had already established
a moment of silence for "meditation," the legislature had no conceivable reason for later authorizing a moment for "meditation or voluntary prayer" except to endorse and promote prayer. 82
But this argument is patently flawed. The later enactment might
well have been intended, as Justice White pointed out, simply to answer a controversial question not explicitly resolved by the earlier statute, i.e., to make clear that students could use the moment of silence
for prayer if they so chose. 83 Moreover, the later statute did not
merely add the words "or voluntary prayer" to the existing provision;
unlike the earlier statute, it extended authorization for a moment of
silence to grades seven through twelve. This extension could have
been the statute's primary objective, with the words "meditation or
voluntary prayer" added to clarify a point that the earlier statute had
failed to address. In an exhibit of consummate illogic, the majority
dismissed the extension to grades seven through twelve as "of no relevance" because none of the Jaffree children, on whose behalf the action challenging the statute had been brought, happened to be in those
grades. 84 But even if the legislators supporting the statute knew of the
Jaffree children's existence - an unlikely supposition - the statute
surely was not enacted for the sole benefit of those three children;
some Alabama children presumably were enrolled in grades seven
through twelve, even if the Jaffrees were not. Thus, it was the Court's
argument, not the statutory extension, that was irrelevant to the issue
of legislative purpose.
The problem of disguised legislative intent was not a pressing one
in Wallace; indeed, Senator Holmes seemingly was penalized not for
dissembling but for being too candid. But the decision might well signal legislators in the future to be more cunning in their statements of
purpose. Justice O'Connor noted this risk, but dismissed it with the
statement that she had "little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one." 85 This expression of confidence is not reassuring, particularly because it
followed a paragraph in which O'Connor emphasized that the inquiry
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

472
472
472
472
472

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at
at

75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58-59 (majority opinion); 472 U.S. at 77-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91 (White, J., dissenting).
59.
75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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into legislative purpose should be "deferential and limited," and that if
a plausible secular purpose is expressed, "then courts should generally
defer to that stated intent." 86 It is far from clear how a court can be
expected to distinguish sham purposes from sincere ones when it is
also required to "defer to ... stated intent.''
The dilemma implicit in Justice O'Connor's position regarding deference became apparent in Edwards. Louisiana's "creationism" statute expressly recited that its purpose was to protect academic
freedom. 87 Protection of academic freedom is surely a permissible secular purpose; thus, if the Court had chosen to "defer to that stated
intent," it presumably would have upheld the statute. Instead, the
Court, with O'Connor's concurrence, found the stated purpose to be a
"sham." 88 Whether or not this conclusion was correct,89 it underscored another problem with "intent" tests: In invalidating a measure
under such a test, a court cannot avoid expressing disrespect for the
officials of other branches by attributing unconstitutional motives to
them. Moreover, if those officials have asserted a proper purpose, as in
Edwards, a court's conclusion that the stated purpose is a "sham" impugns not only the legislators' motives but also their honesty. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the implication of the Court's analysis in
Edwards was that "the members of the Louisiana Legislature knowingly violated their oaths [to uphold the Constitution] and then lied
about it." 90
2.

The Special Problems

Beyond these frequently noted difficulties that inhere in any "intent" inquiry, the "no endorsement" test creates further complications
because it does not ask simply what government intended,· it asks what
government intended to communicate. But many governmental measures may not have been intended to communicate anything at all.
Sending messages is no doubt an important part of what government
does; but it is hardly all - or even the most important part - of what
government does. Indeed, it seems more plausible to think of legislators and executive officers as wielders of power than as mere senders of
messages, and thus as primarily concerned with the substantive consequences of their acts rather than with the messages which such acts
86. 472 U.S. at 74-75.
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982).
88. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1987). See generally 107 S. Ct. at 2579-83.
89. Justice Scalia strenuously contested the Court's analysis on this point. 107 S. Ct. at 2596605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. 107 S. Ct. at 2592.
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may happen to communicate. 91 Hence, it is possible that measures
challenged under the establishment clause may have been intended to
give material assistance to religious interests but not specifically to
"endorse" religion. The application of O'Connor's "intent" inquiry to
such measures becomes particularly problematic.
Consider the following fictitious, off-the-record exchange between
an opponent of aid to parochial schools and a devout and perfectly
candid legislator who has sponsored such aid.
OPPONENT: In sponsoring the parochial school aid bill, did you
intend to endorse the religion that administers such schools?
LEGISLATOR: No. If I understand what "endorse" means, and I
think I do, I'd have to say the answer is "no."
OPPONENT: But you do belong to the sponsoring religion, don't
you?
LEGISLATOR: Yes, I do.
OPPONENT: And you believe in the teachings and the spiritual authority of that religion, don't you?
LEGISLATOR: Certainly.
OPPONENT: And you also believe the religion is beneficial - to
individuals and to society?
LEGISLATOR: Yes.
OPPONENT: Was it on the basis of those beliefs that you supported
aid to parochial schools?
LEGISLATOR: Yes, I'd say so. At least, those beliefs influenced
my decision. I wouldn't support aid to church schools if I didn't think
their religious influence was beneficial.
OPPONENT: Then I repeat my original question. In voting for aid,
you did intend to endorse the sponsoring religion, didn't you?
LEGISLATOR: I can't honestly say that I did. Now let me be clear
about this: I'll freely admit that I wanted to help the religion, to assist it.
But I wasn't trying to endorse it. If you want to know the truth, as a
legislator I prefer to stay away from publicity on religious issues.
They're a can of worms, especially in a district like mine where people
are divided on those issues. To be quite frank, I wish there were some
91. Justice O'Connor's emphasis upon "messages" rather than material consequences may
reflect the fact that she is a judge, not a legislator or executive officer. Although Supreme Court
Justices exercise coercive authority in the relatively few cases which they actually hear and decide, their broader influence lies in the messages they send, through published opinions, to the
vast number of federal and state judges and other governmental officials, as well as to lawyers
and the public generally. (Of course, this "message" orientation would naturally be even more
congenial to legal scholars, who influence public policy, if at all, only through the communication of messages.)
A more cynical interpretation might see in O'Connor's emphasis upon "messages" an implicit
vision of an ineffectual government composed of officials whose primary activity is posturing, and
whose principal concern is to curry popularity by communicating the right messages. In an
image-conscious political era, and especially during an administration presided over by a chief
executive celebrated as a "Great Communicator," this vision of government is, unfortunately,
not preposterous. Neither, however, is it a constitutionally mandated presupposition for first
amendment doctrine.
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way to get the money to the schools without letting anyone know about
it, like the way Congress funds the CIA; it would arouse less controversy
that way. But the church schools perform a valuable function; and at
present they can't operate effectively without state help. That's the reason - the only reason - why I sponsored the bill.
OPPONENT: But I'm afraid I still don't understand. You say you
didn't intend to endorse religion. But if you didn't intend to endorse
religion by sponsoring the bill, then what message could you possibly
have been trying to communicate?
LEGISLATOR: I wasn't trying to communicate anything, of course.
If I'd wanted to communicate, or to endorse something, I wouldn't have
sponsored a bill. I'd have proposed a resolution, or made a public statement, or written a letter to the editor. Do you think I don't know how to
communicate when I want to?

The position reflected in this dialogue is not unrepresentative. To
be sure, some politicians do seek to attract the votes of religious persons by sending messages endorsing religion. But other supporters of
governmental assistance to religious interests or institutions may often
attempt, if only for tactical reasons, to provide such assistance in disguised forms carefully crafted to avoid endorsing religion: The Minnesota school aid program, 92 and the preparation of "creation science"
textbooks carefully cleansed of explicit biblical references,9 3 may be
cases in point. In many instances, it would be disingenuous for the
supporters of such measures to deny that they hope to help, or to advance, religion. But their concern - and their intent in backing such
measures - is apparently to extend material assistance to religion, not
to send messages endorsing religion. Asking whether such measures
are intended to communicate a message of endorsement seems nonsensical; they are not intended to communicate at all.
An apologist for the "no endorsement" test might counter this objection in several ways; but none seems wholly satisfactory. The apologist might minimize the force of the objection by arguing that nearly
all laws are intended to be communicative; communication of
messages is virtually always one intended objective of government action, even if there are also other, and perhaps more important, substantive objectives. But this suggestion, even if correct, raises further
difficulties. If a measure is intended both to endorse religion and to
serve objectives other than endorsement, is it invalid under Justice
O'Connor's test? Although O'Connor has not clearly answered the
question, there is some indication that she would not invalidate a law
unless the impermissible intent to endorse predominates. 94 If predom92. The program is described in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
93. See SCJENTll'IC CREATIONISM {H. Morris ed. 1974).
94. In Edwards, O'Connor joined in a concurring opinion written by Justice Powell. Powell
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inant intent is required, the problems of assessing intent are compounded: In addition to the already difficult task of deciding what a
legislature intended, a court would also have to determine which
among multiple intents was most influential. On the other hand, the
"no endorsement" test might be construed to mean that any intent to
endorse religion (by one legislator? a majority of legislators? a group
large enough to affect the outcome?) is sufficient to invalidate a law.
But such a construction is not appealing. It would require invalidation of legitimate measures merely because of tangential transgressions
of the endorsement prohibition - seemingly a case of the tail wagging
the dog.
Alternatively, proponents of a "no endorsement" test might try to
deflect the foregoing objection by rejecting the distinction between assisting and endorsing; they might insist that an intent to assist religion
necessarily entails an intent to endorse religion. This tactic, however,
strains the natural meaning of "endorsement" and thereby deprives
the "no endorsement" test of whatever contribution it seeks to make.
In ordinary usage, "endorse" is not synonymous with "assist." I can
"endorse" a political candidate (perhaps against her wishes) without
giving her any assistance; my endorsement may be a positive embarrassment to her campaign. Or I can give material assistance to the
candidate (an anonymous contribution, perhaps) without "endorsing"
her. Even to the extent that their meanings converge, "endorsing" is a
subset within the more inclusive category of "assisting"; "endorsement" describes a particular kind of assistance. Of course, ordinary
usage is not sacrosanct; one might simply stipulate that for establishment purposes, all forms of assisting are deemed to constitute endorsements. But what purpose would be served by first identifying
"endorsement" as the touchstone of constitutionality and then stipulating an artificial definition? If "endorsement" must be understood in
a way altogether different than the way it is understood in ordinary
usage, there seems little point in using the term at all. Since Justice
O'Connor obviously believes the concept of "endorsement" contributes something valuable to establishment analysis, she presumably
would not consent to such a sacrifice of meaning.
Finally, proponents of a "no endorsement" test might concede,
either explicitly or by construing "intent" to mean "general" or "constructive" intent, 95 that the "intent" prong of the test has little inwrote: "A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The
religious purpose must predominate." 107 S. Ct. at 2585.
95. Under such a construction, government would be deemed to "intend" all of the natural
consequences of its acts, even if it did not specifically desire to achieve such consequences. Cf.
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dependent relevance to governmental measures not meant to be
primarily communicative in character, and that such measures must
stand or fall upon the "perception" prong of the test. 96 But this understanding of the test has drawbacks of its own. In the first place, if
"endorsement" connotes a communication of approval, why would
outside observers perceive endorsement in a measure that was not intended to communicate anything? Justice O'Connor suggests an answer to this question by distinguishing between the "subjective" and
"objective" meanings of a statement. The "subjective" meaning is
what the speaker intends, and may be determined not only from the
statement itself, but from other evidence such as context or personal
examination of the speaker. But many hearers may not have access to
such extrinsic evidence of intent, and they may thus be forced to ascertain the speaker's intent solely on the basis of the statement itself.
These hearers may thus apprehend a meaning different than what the
speaker intended. O'Connor refers to this other meaning as the "objective" meaning of the statement. 97 Applied to measures not intended
to be communicative, this analysis suggests that outside observers
might perceive communicative intent in an action even though government officials had no such intent.
On a factual level, O'Connor's analysis is perfectly plausible; citizens may often misperceive what government officials intend. One
consequence of this analysis, however, is that the validity or invalidity
of measures intended to assist but not endorse religion becomes wholly
dependent upon misperceptions; such measures would be struck down
only if citizens, or an "objective observer," would attribute to government officials a communicative intent which they did not in fact have.
A doctrine which formally adopted misinformation and misperceptions as the standard for determining the constitutionality of a potentially broad array of public measures would seem, to put it mildly,
anomalous. 98 Moreover, whether O'Connor's hypothetical "objective
observer" could make such a false attribution of communicative intent
W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 35 (5th ed. 1984) ("The actor who fires a bullet into a dense crowd may fervently pray
that the bullet will hit no one, but if the actor knows that it is unavoidable that the bullet will hit
someone, the actor intends that consequence."). Government would be deemed to have intended
an endorsement in precisely those instances in which an endorsement would, in the natural
course, be perceived. See text following note 109 infra.
96. Justice O'Connor's statement in Wallace that "the secular purpose requirement alone
may rarely be determinative in striking down a statute," 472 U.S. at 75, suggests that she might
favor this construction.
97. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 795 n.166 (suggesting that "mistaken public percep·
tions ... should not determine the outcome of cases").
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seems doubtful. 99 If it could not, then measures intended to assist but
not endorse religion would simply be immune to establishment review.
Courts are not likely to embrace such a result, but the effort to avoid it
would put undue pressure on the already shaky concept of "intent to
endorse."
C. Perceptions of Endorsement
The second prong of Justice O'Connor's test, which forbids laws or
practices that create a perception that government has endorsed or disapproved of religion, generates further analytical problems. By making perceptions an independent ground for invalidating a law, the
second prong raises a critical question: Whose perceptions count? 100
Justice O'Connor has suggested two different answers to that question. In Lynch, she implied that the relevant perceptions would be
those of real human beings - the actual flesh-and-blood citizens of
Pawtucket, or perhaps of the nation as a whole. 101 This answer, however, raises insuperable problems. If any citizen's perception that. a
governmental action endorses or disapproves of religion were sufficient
to invalidate the action, then the result would be governmental paralysis; religious diversity in this country is sufficiently broad 102 to ensure
that almost anything government does will likely be seen by someone
as endorsing or disapproving of a religious viewpoint or value. 103 On
99. See notes 108-09 infra and accompanying text.
100. Cf Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592, 611 (1985) (In Lynch, "the Court dispensed at a stroke with what should have been its
paramount concern: from whose perspective do we answer the question whether an official creche
effectively tells minority religious groups and nonbelievers that they are heretics, or at least not
similarly worthy of public endorsement?") (emphasis in original).
101. 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. In addition to the diverse Christian, Judaic, Bahai, and Islamic denominations or faiths,
the last several decades have witnessed the appearance in this country of a large number of "New
Religions." See M. MARTY, A NATION OF BEHAVERS 126-57 (1976). More than a decade ago,
historian Martin Marty offered the following list of "New Religions": "Hinduism, Buddhism,
Sufism, the Occult, Zen, Baba-lovers, Subud, Transcendental Meditation, Tibetan religion, astrology, reincarnation, nature religions, esotericism, drug-associated religion ... Rosicrucians,
Spiritualism, Theosophy, New Thought .... I Am, Unidentified Flying Objects Cults, Guardjieff
[sic] Groups, the Prosperos, Scientology, Abilitism, Builders of the Adytum, the Church of
Light, Neo-Pagan groups, Vedanta Societies, the Self-Realization Fellowship, the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Nichiren Shoshu, and many subspecies." Id. at 126-27.
Marty did not claim that his list was exhaustive, and it has doubtless grown longer since 1976.
103. Recent case law provides evidence for this proposition. For instance, some parents find
a series of widely used school textbooks offensive to their religion because the books are thought
to communicate feminist, pacifist, and humanist values. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub.
Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). On the other band, many other citizens
apparently do not find such values offensive, and might well view removal of the challenged
books from the curriculum as endorsing the religious views of the objectors. Hasidic parents and
school children object to the assignment of female drivers to school buses, but if the state responds by assigning only male drivers to those buses, others may see the action as endorsing the
Hasidic religion. See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

the other hand, to say that the perception must be that of a majority,
or of some designated group of citizens, seems unacceptable. Such a
standard, besides creating additional factual questions about what a
majority perceives, would offend the central principle of Justice
O'Connor's own test by establishing as definitive, and thereby endorsing, the religious viewpoint of a majority or other designated group
while discounting the religious perspective of minorities or
outsiders. 104
The other general kind of answer to the question of whose perceptions count would reject the perceptions of actual citizens as a controlling standard, and instead would adopt the perceptions of a fictitious,
judicially created observer. Since Wallace, Justice O'Connor has
adopted this course. The dispositive question, in her view, is not factual but legal; the question is whether a law or practice would be perceived as endorsement by a hypothetical "objective observer."105
However, in avoiding one set of problems, O'Connor encounters
another. In the first place, a purely fictitious character will perceive
precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to perceive;
and there is no empirical touchstone or outside referent upon which a
critic could rely to show that the author was wrong. The most that
could be said in a given case is that the "objective observer's" percepIn Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), the plaintiffs asserted that the government's use of Social
Security numbers in administering welfare programs violated their religious beliefs. Under current doctrine, this assertion took the form of a free exercise claim entitling the objectors at most
to individualized treatment, but if the perception of endorsement or disapproval by any citizen
were sufficient to indicate an establishment violation, the administration of the program as a
whole conceivably might be subject to challenge. Finally, sodomy statutes, such as the one upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), pose an obvious dilemma for an endorsement analysis. Many observers may view such statutes as reflecting and endorsing the view of,
for instance, Fundamentalist Christians that homosexuality is biblically prohibited and morally
wrong. Conversely, some Fundamentalist Christians would undoubtedly perceive the repeal or
invalidation of such statutes as reflecting disapproval or rejection of their religious beliefs.
104. See Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1648 ("If the establishment clause is to prohibit
government from sending the message to religious minorities or nonadherents that the state fa.
vors certain beliefs and that as nonadherents they are not fully members of the political community, its application must turn on the message received by the minority or no11adherent. ")
(emphasis in original). Cf. Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 863, 868 (1986) (asserting that the "key objective" of the establishment clause is "to safeguard minorities and outsiders with respect to religious beliefs"),
105. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. This may seem tantamount to saying
that the dispositive perceptions are those of Supreme Court Justices themselves. But it is unlikely that Justice O'Connor would actually formulate the test in this way. If perceptions of the
Supreme Court were adopted as the standard, then in striking down a statute under the "pcrccp·
ti on" prong of the test, the Court would in essence be saying to the legislature: "Even though we
do not find (under the first prong) that you illlended to endorse religion, the law you enacted is
nonetheless invalid because we, the Justices, perceive it as an endorsement of religion." It is hard
to make sense of such an assertion; if the Justices believe no endorsement was intended, then they
at least should not perceive the Jaw as an endorsement (although they might recognize that
someone else would so perceive it). Thus, at least in form, the controlling perceptions must be
those of someone other than the Supreme Court.
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tions are remarkably unlike those of most real human beings. But that
criticism is of doubtful force, because the adoption of a fictitious observer as the standard represents a deliberate decision that the perceptions of real human beings should not control. Thus, O'Connor's
adoption of a fictitious perceiver drains the test's perception prong of
whatever truly objective content it otherwise might have; 106 and it
thereby reduces the test's capacity to provide guidance to governmental officials or to lower courts, as well as the possibility for critical
evaluation of a court's application of the test. 107
Furthermore, the adoption of an "objective observer" standard
logically tends to bring about the collapse of O'Connor's second prong
into her first prong. Though disembodied, Justice O'Connor's observer hardly operates behind a veil of ignorance. A principal advantage of a fictitious observer, rather, is that its perceptions need not be
subject to the limitations which afflict mere mortals. 108 Thus, unlike
most ordinary citizens, the "objective observer" is said to be familiar
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute
under review. 109 All of this comes very close to saying that the observer knows the legislators' objectives in adopting the law - or, in
106. Although generally favorable to the "no endorsement" test, William Marshall finds the
"objective observer" standard "incomprehensible. Is the objective observer (or average person) a
religious person, an agnostic, a separationist, a person sharing the predominate religious sensibility of the community, or one holding a minority view?" Marshall, supra note 45, at 537. Marshall's own attempt to overcome this problem by specifying the appropriate perspectives is
considered at notes 216-28 infra and accompanying text.
107. O'Connor's fictitious "objective observer" may seem analogous to the hypothetical "reasonable person" who has served tolerably well as a.standard in tort law. But the "reasonable
person" standard functions in tort law as an open-ended device for turning over to juries, in the
guise of issues of fact, questions that cannot and need not be answered in any uniform way. See
Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 27?, 294-303
(1984). O'Connor envisions no similar function for her "objective observer." She does not want
the question of perception to be treated as an issue of fact, and she has shown little deference to
the factual findings of lower court judges on this issue. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (perception prong raises question of law, not of fact); Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 693-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (treating perception as question of law and rejecting district
court's finding that creche was perceived as endorsing Christianity).
·
108. As noted, for instance, O'Connor has suggested that the "objective observer" is possessed of a good understanding of the nature and scope of the values embodied in the free exercise clause - an understanding which seemingly would surpass anything the Supreme Court or
academic commentators have thus far achieved. See Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of
Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1986) (observing that "free exercise jurisprudence
... rests on values we have seldom tried to state, much less justify").
109. See Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76
(O'Connor, J., concurring). By endowing the "objective observer" with such knowledge, Justice
O'Connor silently but effectively dissolves the distinction made in Lynch between "s.ubjective"'
and "objective" meanings. The possibility of an "objective" meaning which diverges from "subjective" meaning was said to arise, after all, precisely because real human beings perceiving government actions often do not have access to such extrinsic evidence of the intended, "subjective"
meaning. See text at note 97 supra.
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other words, that the observer knows what the legislators intended.
Indeed, this conclusion seems inescapable. In applying the test's first
prong, after all, judges must determine whether legislators intended to
endorse religion; and surely the "objective observer," who is privy to
the same information, can ascertain at least as much. Thus, the judge
who examines the text, background, and implementation of a law and
concludes that the law was not intended to endorse religion should
rule that an "objective observer" examining the same factors would
draw the same conclusion. To rule otherwise would be to confess that
the judge is not being "objective."
But if the "objective observer" knows what the legislators intended, then the observer will perceive endorsement in all those instances, and only in those instances, in which the judge believes an
intent to endorse exists. Of course, the observer might recognize that
other perceivers - real human beings not blessed with the observer's
knowledge of text, legislative history, and implementation - will
sometimes perceive an intent to endorse even when none exists. But
the perceptions of such other mortal perceivers no longer controls;
that, after all, is why the "objective observer" was created. To the
"objective observer," intent and perception will inevitably coincide.
Thus, the two prongs of the test cease to operate independently, but
instead dissolve into each other.
Far from being a flaw in the test, such a reduction, at least if it
were acknowledged, might seem to be a victory for simplicity. The
problem is that a focus either upon legislative intent or upon the fictitious perceptions of a disembodied observer diverges from the purpose
which Justice O'Connor attributes to the "no endorsement" test. As
noted, O'Connor has explained that the "no endorsement" test seeks
to prevent government from sending messages which lead some citizens to believe that they are "outsiders" because of their religious beliefs.110 If that is the purpose of the test, however, then the pertinent
fact controlling the application of the test should be neither the perhaps indiscernible intent of government officials nor the imagined perceptions of a fictitious observer; the controlling standard, rather,
should be the actual perceptions of real citizens. If citizens in fact
perceive that government is endorsing or disapproving of religion,
then they may feel like "outsiders," even though the legislators intended no such consequence (and even though a hypothetical "objective observer" would suffer no similar sense of exclusion). Conversely,
if citizens do not in fact perceive an endorsement of religion, then they
110. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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are not made to feel like "outsiders" because of their religion regardless of what legislators may have intended, or what an "objective observer" might perceive. Thus, the content of Justice O'Connor's test
does not correspond to its ostensible purpose.
Hence, there seems to be no satisfactory response to the question of
whose perception should count. One may attempt to answer that
question either by enthroning the perceptions of actual citizens or by
constructing an artificial perceiver, as O'Connor does; but either response generates serious practical and theoretical problems of its own.
D. Religion
Although the difficulty of defining "religion" is hardly unique to
the "no endorsement" test, the test threatens to aggravate the difficulty. Both the Lemon test and the establishment clause itself use the
term "religion," and one might therefore suppose that courts could
not decide establishment cases without first defining what "religion"
means. But the Supreme Court has in fact had little to say on the
subject. 111 By contrast to many legal questions that are answerable
conceptually but difficult to resolve in practice, the question of what
"religion" means is daunting on a conceptual level, 112 but has posed
remarkably few problems in actual cases. It is necessary to consider
how this fortunate state of affairs has come to exist and whether adoption of a "no endorsement" test would alter it.

r.

De.fining ''Religion" Under Existing Doctrine

Although the definition of religion has rarely been troublesome in
establishment cases, 113 the question has created greater difficulty in
free exercise cases. 114 The more frequent occurrence in free exercise
111. The Court's limited pronouncements on the meaning of religion are discussed in Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 759-61.
112. The vast diversity of religions and religious beliefs, see note 102 supra, has led scholars
to doubt the possibility of formulating any satisfactory definition of "religion"; some scholars
have urged the Court not to attempt the task. Phillip Johnson asserts that "[t]he fact is that no
definition of religion for constitutional purposes exists, and no satisfactory definition is likely to
be conceived." Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendme/lt Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 832 (1984). See also Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional
Definition of ''Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1548 (1983) (suggesting that the question be answered by looking for "family resemblances" rather than by declaring a definition); Greenawalt,
supra note 57, at 762-76 (advocating an analogical rather than definitional approach).
113. In most cases, the religious nature of the institution or interest at issue has not been
controversial. But cj Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding after lengthy
analysis that Transcendental Meditation is religion under the establishment clause).
114. For instance, in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Supreme Court struggled with the question of whether an ethical objection to war could be considered "religious."
Although the majority treated the question as one of statutory construction, Justice Harlan
pointed out that the construction was severely strained and concurred on free exercise grounds.

296

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

cases of disputes about what counts as "religion" seems to result from
two differences between the clauses: viewpoint and standing.11 5
a. Viewpoint. Some citizens may consider a particular institution
or interest to· be religious even though government officials do not.
The question of viewpoint asks whose perspective should control.
Although the issue is seldom addressed explicitly, establishment decisions tacitly adopt the viewpoint of the government. 116 The free exercise clause, by contrast, focuses upon the individual's perspective. If
free exercise is designed to safeguard conscience, or to spare individuals the painful choice of either breaking the law or violating their religious duty, it makes no sense to adopt government's view of what
conscience 'and religious duty demand; the individual's perspective
must provide the standard. 1 17
The choice of viewpoint, of course, does not supply a definition
telling what "religion" means, ·bl!t the choice strongly influences the
frequency with which that question is thrust upon the courts. There
are certain institutions, practices, and beliefs - the Catholic Church,
prayer, and the Apostles' Creed, to mention some obvious examples 398 U.S. at 344-67 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025,
1034 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting claim that MOVE, described as a "revolutionary" organization
"absolutely opposed to all that is wrong," is a religion); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) (ruling after considerable discussion that Hubbard Electrometers, or "E-Meters," are part of religious practice);
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting claim that Neo-American Church, devoted to drug use, is a genuine religion); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (ruling that use of peyote is bona fide religious practice of
Native American Church); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d
673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (concluding after lengthy analysis that Fellowship of Humanity is
religion despite lack of belief in Supreme Being).
115. Some commentators might account for the difference by arguing that "religion" has or should have - a broader meaning in free exercise cases, so that courts must decide more
frequently whether borderline cases involve "religion." See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-33 (1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056 (1978). However, the Supreme Court has not thus far accepted the proposition that
"religion" should be given different definitions in the establishment and free exercise clauses.
116. This choice of viewpoint is evident in decisions which, after attributing a legitimate
secular objective to government, uphold a practice or law even though the law's objective would
be viewed as religious by some people. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (rejecting establishment challenge to law restricting abortion funding); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law). If the establishment clause is viewed primarily
as a prohibition forbidding improper exercises of governmental power, rather than as a shield
protecting individual rights, then government's vision of what it is trying to do seems to be the
relevant perspective.
117. Professor Laurence Tribe asserts that "when free exercise issues are raised, religious
claims are to be examined not in terms of the majority's concept of religion but in terms of the
social function of the group, or in terms of the role the beliefs assume in the individual's life." L.
TRIBE, supra note 115, at 831. But cf BeVier, The Free Exercise Clause: A View From the Public
Forum. 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 963, 973 (1986) (tentatively suggesting that it would be preferable to "look[] at the free exercise clause principally as a constraint on lawmaking power instead
of principally as a guarantor of a certain quantum of individual liberty").
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which nearly everyone would regard as religious; and there are other
institutions, practices, and beliefs - for example, the Aryan Nations
Church, Transcendental Meditation, and ethical objection to military
service - which are controversial or borderline cases. To the extent
that litigation affects institutions or interests which nearly everyone
regards as religious, borderline cases and the problem of definition
need not be addressed. The adoption of the government's viewpoint in
establishment cases takes advantage of such areas of consensus, because government's views regarding what is "religious" and what is
"secular" are likely to correspond to conventional views held by people in the community. Thus, government and most citizens are likely
to agree that parochial schools have a "religious" component, and that
increasing economic prosperity is a "secular" objective. Some people
may see such matters differently, but there is generally no need, under
current establishment doctrine, to grapple with unorthodox
viewpoints.
Conversely, by adopting the viewpoint of individuals objecting to
government practices, free exercise decisions are more likely to bring
unconventional perspectives to the forefront. There is no general consensus that the taking of hallucinogenic drugs, 118 or the use of "Hubbard Electrometers," 11 9 are religious exercises; but some people believe
they are, and the believers' perspective is critical in free exercise cases.
Such cases are thus more likely to involve courts in exploring the
boundaries of what can be considered "religion."
b. Standing. A second difference between the establishment and
free exercise cases concerns the kind of injury needed to confer standing to sue. The Supreme Court has ruled that mere awareness of a
constitutional violation does not qualify as such an injury; 120 and this
limitation may pose problems for prospective plaintiffs seeking to assert establishment challenges. The principal kind of evil against which
the establishment clause protects is institutional, not individual. Governmental action violating the clause generally involves some form of
support for religion. But the religion so benefited is not injured, and in
any event is unlikely to complain about such support; and nonadherents to the religion may be hard pressed to show any concrete injury
which they personally have suffered. Aware of this difficulty, the
courts have in some instances relaxed standing requirements - by allowing taxpayer standing, for instance - to permit establishment
118. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
119. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
120. See, e.g.. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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challenges that otherwise might never reach the courts. 121 Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has been little inclined to grant such indulgences.122 As a result, persons holding borderline or idiosyncratic
views of "religion" may be unable to challenge government practices
on establishment grounds.
Conversely, if such persons are not merely offended by government's support for what they regard as religion, but are actually inhibited in exercising their own religious beliefs, they will likely have
standing to complain on free exercise grounds. 123 Inhibition in the
exercise of one's religion is precisely the kind of injury that the free
exercise clause is designed to prevent. 124 By so defining the nature of
the cognizable injury, therefore, free exercise doctrine is more likely to
confer standing upon persons who hold unconventional views of what
is "religion," and who may therefore force the definitional issue upon
the courts.
These differences in viewpoint and standing help to explain why
the Supreme Court has been able largely to avoid the problem of defining religion in establishment cases. One might wisely hope that this
situation will continue. Fashioning a general definition of religion
seems virtually impossible; 125 thus, forcing courts to address the definitional issue would almost certainly add one more source of confusion to establishment doctrine.1 26
121. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (permitting challenge to parochial school
aid on basis of taxpayer standing).
122. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (distinguishing F/ast, and denying taxpayer and citizen standing in
establishment clause case); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534
(1986) (rejecting board member's standing in individual, official, and parental capacities to appeal from lower court decision requiring school to permit student prayer club to meet during
activity periods).
123. In theory, inhibition of religion may also implicate the establishment clause. But
although the Lemon test purports to forbid measures whose principal effect either advances or
inhibits religion, Professor Laycock points out that the "inhibition" provision of Lemo11 is analytically out of place, and that the Court has never applied it in an actual holding. Laycock, To-

wards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relatio11s a11d the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380-85 (1981).
124. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
125. See note 112 supra.
126. It might seem that there is little point in avoiding definitional questions in establishment
cases if the same questions will still have to be addressed in free exercise cases. But the consequences of answering such questions in free exercise cases is often less far-reaching. Unlike establishment challenges, which if successful may lead to the general invalidation of a law or the
general elimination of a practice, free exercise cases usually involve claims for a special exemption from a law or regulation. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying
exemption from military dress code); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting exemption from compulsory education requirement). See generally Stone, Constitutio11ally Compelled
Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 985 (1986). Because in a
free exercise case no general invalidation is sought, no general definition of religion is required; it
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Defining ''Religion" Under the "No Endorsement" Test

Adoption of a "no endorsement" test, however, is likely to have
just that effect. The test would introduce the free exercise features of
viewpoint and standing into establishment doctrine, thereby multiplying the occasions in which courts may become embroiled in troublesome definitional issues.
a. Viewpoint. The "no endorsement" test, by mandating invalidation of laws creating a "perception" that government has endorsed
religion, introduces a nongovernmental viewpoint into establishment
doctrine. In incorporating outsiders' perceptions that religion is being
endorsed, the test also incorporates outsiders' conceptions of what
"religion" is. Thus, a challenged law would have to survive tests employing both the governmental viewpoint (under the "intent" prong)
and a nongovernmental viewpoint (under the "perception" prong).
To be sure, the test's nongovernmental viewpoint might not include the perspectives of persons holding unconventional or idiosyncratic views of religion, since their perspectives might not correspond
to those of Justice O'Connor's "objective observer." Still, in ruling
that an "objective observer" would not regard the object of a particu7
lar governmental endorsement as religious, a judge would likely be
confronted with the argument that some members of the community
do regard the object as religious. And in responding to that argument,
a responsible judge would inevitably be forced to explain the reasons
why he, or the "objective observer," declined to adopt those citizens'
conception of "religion." 127 Thus, even if the "no endorsement" test's
perception prong does not actually encompass unconventional views
held by members of the community, it would force courts to respond
to those views, and thus to become involved in definitional issues
about religion.
b. Standing. Justice O'Connor has not expressly addressed the
question of standing under her proposed test, but the logic of her proposal prescribes a much broader eligibility to sue. Under existing establishment doctrine, the evil to be prevented is improper
governmental support for, or entanglement with, religion. Thus, the
clause is primarily concerned with maintaining proper institutional relations. O'Connor's analysis, by contrast, reconceives the purpose of
the establishment clause as individual rather than institutional. Her
is enough to decide that the particular plaintiff sincerely regards an interest or belief as religious.
Establishment decisions are not so easily limited.
127. This problem is implicit in Lynch; it does not become conspicuous there simply because
Justice O'Connor's opinion makes scant effort to confront directly, or to show the errors of, the
views of Jews and others who see the creche as a religious symbol. See note 132 infra.
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proposal aims to prevent government from sending messages which
make some citizens feel like "outsiders" because of their nonadherence
to particular religious beliefs. 128 A person who perceives that a law
endorses a religious belief which he does not accept, and who thus
feels like an "outsider," has suffered precisely the kind of injury that
the establishment clause, in O'Connor's view, is designed to prevent;
and he should therefore have standing to challenge the law.
Indeed, the logic of O'Connor's position would exceed free exercise
doctrine in conferring standing to sue. Under the free exercise clause,
a plaintiff generally must show that the law or practice in question
imposes a "substantial" or "severe" burden on the exercise of her religion.129 But if the evil prevented by the establishment clause is the
sending of messages which make citizens feel like "outsiders," as
O'Connor contends, an establishment clause plaintiff logically should
not be required to allege a "substantial" or "severe" burden on the
exercise of his religion. It should be sufficient, rather, to assert that he
feels like an "outsider" because of some governmental message touching upon religion.
Thus, the conception of injury embodied in Justice O'Connor's test
offers an expansive license for dissatisfied citizens holding unconventional views of religion to challenge government policy on religious
grounds. In doing so, her conception also increases the likelihood that
courts will be forced to struggle with definitional questions about what
"religion" means. Such a development is not calculated to improve
the clarity and consistency of establishment jurisprudence.
E.

The Fruits of Incoherence

The foregoing analysis has suggested that the "no endorsement"
approach is riven by ambiguities and analytical flaws. These problems
in the approach are not merely academic; their effect is to render the
"no endorsement" test ineffectual as a doctrinal tool. Because the test
is composed of unmanageable or fatally ambiguous concepts, it cannot
provide the needed predictability or guidance for lower courts and
other government officials. Although the Court has not actually
adopted the "no endorsement" test, a comparison of the analyses of
particular controversies advocated by Justice O'Connor and by others
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (striking down Indiana law
which denied unemployment compensation to Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in arms
factory because law put "substantial pressure on an adherent ... to violate his beliefs"): Wiscon·
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (noting, in exempting Amish from compulsory school
attendance, that "[t]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the
Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable").
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who also favor a "no endorsement" approach demonstrates that the
"no endorsement" test would not provide clarity or predictability to
establishment jurisprudence.
Lynch itself supports this criticism. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that a city's inclusion of a creche in a publicly sponsored Christmas display constitutes an endorsement of Christianity. 130
Commentators have generally agreed. 131 To the extent that empirical
evidence has any bearing upon the question, the evidence would seem
to support the argument of the qissent: At least some citizens evidently perceived the city's inclusion of a creche in the Christmas display as an objectionable endorsement of religion. 132 Nonetheless,
Justice O'Connor, the test's author, concluded that the city's use of the
creche reflected no intent to endorse Christianity and would not create
perceptions of such endorsement.
Further evidence of the test's indeterminate character appears in a
recent article written by Professor Arnold Loewy. Loewy likes the "no
endorsement" test. 133 In applying that test to particular controversies,
however, he concludes that Pawtucket's sponsorship of a nativity
scene violated the establishment clause, 134 that Alabama's "moment of
silence" law probably did not violate the clause, 135 and that ceremonial
invocations of deity, such as those occurring in the Pledge of Allegiance or the opening of a Supreme Court session, do violate the "no
endorsement" test. 136 In each instance, Justice O'Connor would disagree.137 Thus, Professor Loewy and Justice O'Connor, while purporting to apply the same test, would regularly reach precisely
opposite conclusions in a wide range of controversies. Such disparate
conclusions underscore the analytical deficiencies which destroy the
test's usefulness as a practical doctrinal tool.
130. 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 100, at 611; Loewy, supra note 45, at 1065.
132. The plaintiffs in the case all perceived the creche "as demonstrating the City's support
for the Christian religion." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.R.!. 1981), affd., 691
F.2d 1029 (!st Cir. 1982), revd., 465 U.S. 668 (1984). More generally, Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the creche did not endorse religion "came as a surprise to most Jews." Tushnet,
supra note 12, at 712 n.52. Leo Pfeffer asserts that the creche was offensive not only to Jews but
also to the National Council of Churches, Baptists, Unitarians, and to "Ethical Culturalists, and
secularists." L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 120.
133. Loewy, supra note 45, at 1050-51.
134. Id. at 1065.
135. Id. at 1068.
136. Id. at 1055-58.
137. O'Connor concurred, as described above, in the results in the creche and moment of
silence cases. She has indicated that ceremonial invocations of deity on coins and in the opening
of a Supreme Court session are permissible. Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693.
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DEFECTIVE THEORY: INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
"No ENDORSEMENT" PRINCIPLE

The foregoing analysis suggests that the "no endorsement" test is
unlikely to improve upon Lemon as a formulation of workable doctrine. But courts and lawyers are all too used to working with imperfect doctrine; thus, the doctrinal shortcomings of the "no
endorsement" test might be excused if powerful theoretical justifications for the test could be produced. This section analyzes several
likely justifications for a "no endorsement" principle, including the
theoretical rationale proposed by Justice O'Connor. The section concludes that far from providing grounds for indulging the test's practical flaws, the justifications are themselves vitiated by analytical defects
that cast further doubt on the "no endorsement" proposal.
A. Is the ''No Endorsement" Principle Self-Evident?
The analysis in this section asks whether the central proposition
contained in Justice O'Connor's proposal, i.e., the proposition that
government should be constitutionally precluded from endorsing or
disapproving of religion, can be justified. To some, however, that central proposition may seem axiomatic or self-evident - and thus
neither in need of nor susceptible of further justification. 138 But this
position is unpersuasive. Governmental endorsement of religion has a
long history in this country. From the Continental Congress 139
through the framing of the Bill of Rights 140 and on down to the present day, government and government officials - including Presidents
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and, of course, Ronald Reagan, not to mention the Supreme Court itself 141 - have frequently
expressed approval of religion and religious ideas.1 42 Such history
may not prove that governmental approval of religion is constitution138. See, e.g., McCoy & Kurtz, supra note 10, at 257 (asserting without supporting justifica·
tion that endorsement is a "per se" violation of the establishment clause).
139. Thomas Curry notes, for instance, that the Continental Congress "sprinkled its proceedings liberally with the mention of God, Jesus Christ, the Christian religion, and many other
religious references." T. CURRY, THE Frnsr FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE Frnsr AMENDMENT 217 (1986).
140. Shortly after approving the Bill of Rights, which of course included the establishment
clause, the first Congress resolved to observe a day of thanksgiving and prayer in appreciation of
"the many signal favors of Almighty God." Id.
141. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (asserting that "this is a Christian nation").
142. See generally Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237
(1986).
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ally proper. 143 But the history at least demonstrates that many Americans, including some of our early eminent statesmen, have believed
such approval was proper. That fact alone is sufficient to show that
the "no endorsement" principle is controversial, not easily selfevident.
Indeed, far from being self-evident, the "no endorsement" principle when viewed in context seems positively counterintuitive. Despite
occasional calls for "strict separation" or "strict neutrality," virtually
everyone concedes that some beneficial interactions between government and religion are allowable; even the self-professed absolutists
who dissented in Everson v. Board of Education agreed that the state
should at least extend police and fire protection to churches. 144 Thus,
the critical question asks what criteria should be used to distinguish
between those beneficial interactions that are permissible and those
that are impermissible. Many establishment decisions have focused on
the kind or extent of actual material benefit conferred on religion:
Does the law at issue "have as a principal or primary effect the advancement or inhibition of religion?" 145 By contrast, Justice
O'Connor's test discards actual material benefit as the governing crite-.
rion and instead looks primarily to the message that a law conveys. It
is natural, and only partially misleading, to conclude that "O'Connor
seems to be saying that appearance supercedes reality." 146
Viewed in this way, however, the "no endorsement" principle is
not axiomatic. On the contrary, it would hardly seem implausible to
suggest that O'Connor has things exactly backwards: Government
should not bestow actual benefits upon religion, it might be argued,
but "mere" endorsement of religion is thoroughly in keeping with our
traditions. Thus, proponents of a "no endorsement" approach to the
establishment clause cannot rest on the assumption that their position
is self-evident; they must be prepared to argue for it. 147
143. Cf. Laycock, supra note 45, at 913 ("The argument cannot be merely that anything the
Framers did is constitutional. ... Of course the state and federal establishment clauses did not
abruptly end all customs in tension with their implications. No innovation ever does.").
144. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1947) (Rutledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
145. This inquiry constitutes the second prong of the Lemon test and has thus been used in
hundreds of decisions.
146. Gibney, State Aid to Religious-Affiliated Schools: A Political Analysis, 28 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 119, 144 n.164 (1986). The conclusion is partially misleading because appearances and
symbols are part of, and not simply images of, the overall reality in which citizens live.
147. In unguarded moments, even Justice O'Connor herself seems instinctively to reject her
own approach. Perhaps the clearest test cases for the "no endorsement" proposal would be
instances in which government verbally endorses, but gives no material assistance to, religion.
Purely ceremonial public references to deity or religion seem to present such test cases, and in
those cases O'Connor finds no constitutional infirmity. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J.,
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The Divisiveness Argument

A second theoretical justification might assert that a "no endorsement" principle serves to prevent division along religious lines. 148 Justices and scholars have divided over whether prevention of religious
division should be a governing policy in establishment analysis. 149
Even if potential divisiveness is a proper and substantial constitutional
concern, however, the connection between that concern and a "no endorsement" principle is tenuous at best. To be sure, governmental endorsement of religion may be divisive. By the same token, however,
governmental refusal to endorse religion may be divisive. Indeed, if
more than a few citizens believe that government should approve or
support religion in some way, then a refusal by government to provide
such approval or support may engender more contention than the approval itself would provoke. 150 Lynch is a case in point. Although
Pawtucket's sponsorship of the creche manifestly offended some of the
city's citizens, i.e., the plaintiffs, the attempt to remove the creche generated an even greater wave of opposition and hostility; the mayor
testified that he had "never seen people as mad as they are over this
issue." 151 Nor is the Pawtucket experience atypical. 152
Thus, adoption of a "no endorsement" principle would not end
concurring). Similarly, presidential proclamations calling for public prayers of thanksgiving seem
to be clear instances of endorsement. Nonetheless, in Wallace, O'Connor suggested that these
proclamations are permissible, observing that unlike school prayers, such proclamations "are
received in a noncoercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who presumably are not
readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). O'Connor's observation seems both accurate and wholly beside the point - at least
if endorsement is the constitutional evil to be avoided. Her argument suggests that it is really
coercion or unwilling indoctrination, not simple endorsemellt, that should be the touchstone of
constitutionality.
148. See Loewy, supra note 45, at 1070 ("[T]he best way for the Court to keep the peace is to
refuse to tolerate endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
149. Compare Lemon.v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (declaring that "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect"), with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (denying that "political divisiveness alone can
serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct"). See also Gibney, supra note 146, at 147
("Political divisiveness is not a meaningful judicial standard"); McConnell, Political and Reli·
gious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 413 ("Religious differences in this country
have never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the
Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery."); Schwarz, No Imposi·
tion of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 710-11 (1968) (criticizing
divisiveness argument).
150. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 347 ("The invalidation of a 'divisive' policy because of its
supposed 'divisiveness' can be the most 'divisive' action of all.").
151. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. ll50, ll62 (D.R.I. 1981).
152. See Smith, The Special Place ofReligion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 94·
98 (Supreme Court's establishment decisions have intensified rather than reduced religious con·
flict); cj Baker, The Religion Clauses Reconsidered: The Jaffree Case, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 125,
139 (1984) ("The Supreme Court's school-prayer decisions have fanned, rather than doused, the
flames of religious factionalism.").
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division along religious lines. 153 In the aggregate, moreover, it seems
likely that adoption of such a principle would create incentives that
would intensify religious conflicts. If the principle calls for invalidation of laws that are perceived as endorsing or disapproving of religion,
as in Justice O'Connor's formulation, then opponents of a particular
measure have every incentive to wield the equivalent of a "heckler's
veto" by manifesting their disapproving reaction in demonstrative
ways. 154 Moreover, the same incentive may operate on both sides of a
controversy; proponents of a measure may seek to demonstrate that its
rejection or elimination would be perceived by many people as expressing disapproval of a religious value or belief. A test creating such
incentives to demonstrative opposition is difficult to defend as a
method of reducing religious division. 15 5
C.

Endorsement and Political Standing

Cognizant of these difficulties, Justice O'Connor eschews potential
divisiveness as an element of establishment doctrine. 156 Similarly, she
does not assume that the "no endorsement" principle is axiomatic or
self-evident. Instead, she purports to derive the "no endorsement" test
from a more fundamental theoretical argument. Her starting premise
is that "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community." 157 This premise may need clarification; but
the premise is at least an appealing proposition, 158 and the following
153. Donald Beschle, although very much in favor of a "no endorsement" test, observes that
faithful application of the test "is likely to outrage separationists" and will be "offensive to some
accommodationists." Beschle, supra note 45, at 191.
154. Even if the dispositive perceptions are those of the "objective observer" rather than of
actual citizens, opponents of a measure might reasonably suppose that the visible reactions of
actual human beings will at least influence a judge's opinion about what an "objective observer"
would perceive.
155. CJ Johnson, supra note 112, at 831 ("[B]y encouraging persons who are easily offended
by religious symbolism to believe that the courts stand open to remedy their complaints, the
courts foster divisive conflicts over religion.").
156. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. 465 U.S. at 687; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
158. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, Justice O'Connor's premise can claim historical plausibility. In late seventeenth-century England, religious dissenters were tolerated but denied political rights. See R. BARLOW, CITIZENSHIP AND CONSCIENCE 57-76 (1962). This situation
persisted in the colonies; dissenters were often permitted to worship but were "excluded from
universities and disqualified for office, whether civil, religious, pr military." L. LEVY. supra note
5, at 4. The establishment clause may well have been meant to remedy this situation. Thus,
Thomas Jefferson·s original religious freedom bill for Virginia had decreed that "our civil rights
have no dependance on our religious opinions." Jefferson, A Bil/for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (emphasis added). And Madison's first proposed version of what became the establishment clause
provided that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor-
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analysis will assume that it is, in some sense, correct. O'Connor then
asserts that governmental endorsement of religion "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community." 159 Although this proposition may be debatable,160 the
present discussion will accept the proposition as provisionally true.
Even if both propositions are accepted, however, O'Connor's argument nonetheless fails because she provides no plausible link between
them. Her attempt to tie endorsement of religion to the political
standing of citizens is unpersuasive. To be sure, a law diminishing or
elevating the political standing of citizens on religious grounds might
also endorse or disapprove of religion, and vice versa. But those consequences of such a law are practically and analytically distinct. Thus,
a doctrine forbidding endorsement of religion would operate haphazardly at best in preventing diminution or elevation of citizens' political
status on the basis of their religion.
At one time, for instance, many states had laws which excluded
clergy from serving in the legislature; Tennessee's exclusionary provision survived until 1978, when it was struck down by the Supreme
Court. 161 These laws plainly affected some persons' political standing
on the basis of religion; the exclusionary laws made those persons ineligible for legislative office simply because they had chosen a religious
vocation. On the other hand, whether the laws communicated approval or disapproval of religion is debatable; and the question conceivably might be answered differently in different jurisdictions.162
Such a law might reflect disapproval of religion, implying that ministers are unfit for public office. 163 Conversely, the law might suggest
approval of religion; it might evince a belief that ministers are too virship." T. CURRY, supra note 139, at 199 (emphasis added). Historian Sidney Mead thus concludes that disestablishment meant that "sectarian dogmas and beliefs were made irrelevant to
one's being and status as a citizen of the Republic." S. MEAD, supra note 56, at 41.
159. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Persons who are in the minority on any issue may feel disappointment when their values
or objectives are not adopted by government, but they need not feel like "outsiders" or lesser
members of the political community. Mark Tushnet suggests that religious issues are no different
from other political issues in this respect: "[N]onadherents who believe that they are excluded
from the political community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has
lost a fair fight in the arena of politics." Tushnet, supra note 12, at 712.
161. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Professor Loewy cites McDaniel as a prime
example of the potential explanatory value of a "no endorsement" test. Loewy, supra note 45, at
1052.
162. Such exclusionary laws were carried over from England, where "the practice of excluding clergy from the House of Commons was justified on a variety of grounds." McDaniel, 435
U.S. at 622 (plurality opinion).
163. See Gallant, Disestablished Religion in Pennsylvania and Kentucky: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 J. LEGJS. HIST. (forthcoming) (asserting that Kentucky's exclusionary
provision was inspired by anticlericalism).
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tuous, or are engaged in too important a calling, to be sullied and distracted by mundane political pursuits. 164 Or the law might reflect
neither approval nor disapproval of religion, but merely a belief that
both religion and politics are better off when kept apart. Whether a
given exclusionary law endorses or disapproves of religion thus remains an open question that cannot be answered without further factual investigation. By contrast, no similar factual investigation is
needed in order to decide that the law affects political standing on
religious grounds; it plainly does. The critical point is that a law barring clergy from the legislature affects political status on the basis of
religion whether or not the law also endorses or disapproves of
religion. 165
If laws can alter political status without endorsing or disapproving
religion, the reverse is also true; a law or governmental practice can
endorse religion without altering political standing. Ceremonial uses
of prayer, such as the invocation given before a legislative session, or
public religious allusions such as the motto on coins confessing "In
God We Trust," may communicate support or approval for religious
beliefs. 166 But such endorsements do not appear to alter anyone's actual political standing in any realistic sense; no one loses the right to
vote, the freedom to speak, or any other state or federal right if he or
she does not happen to share the religious ideas that such practices
appear to approve.
Of course, a message suggesting that minorities are not regarded
and treated as full members of the political community might be true;
minorities might actually be discriminated against in their political
and civil rights. That possibility, however, hardly lends support to a
164. The Tennessee constitutional provision, for instance, was explicitly based upon the
premise that "Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of
Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions." McDaniel, 435 U.S.
at 621 n.l (quoting TENN. CoNsr. art. VIII,§ 1 (1796)).
165. Loewy cites the invalidation of religious oath requirements, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961), as another major instance Qfthe explanatory value ofa "no endorsement" test.
Loewy, supra note 45, at 1052. But once again the effect of an oath requirement on political
standing is analytically independent of whether it endorses religion. Imagine, for instance, that
some creative historian demonstrates to everyone's satisfaction that a particular religious oath
requirement originated with a governor who was indifferent to religion and whose purpose in
imposing the requirement was to exclude from office a political rival who happened to be an
atheist. Or the historical evidence might show that the oath requirement was originally imposed
by a madman whose only intent was to be arbitrary or bizarre. Such evidence might convince
everyone that the law had not actually been intended to indicate approval of religion; the law
might thereby lose its "endorsement" effect. Nonetheless, the law's "status alteration" effect
would remain unimpaired; atheists would still be excluded from office. Thus, "endorsement"
and "status alteration" represent distinct, and severable, consequences of the law.
166. Cf. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recellt Developments, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 943, 947 (1986) ("The placement of 'In God We
Trust' on coins and currency ... seems to have no real purpose other than a religious one.").

308

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

test which specifies endorsement as the constitutional evil. Let us suppose that endorsements send messages telling minorities that they are
not full members of the political community, and that they will be
discriminated against in their political and civil rights. Such messages
are either false or true. If the messages are false, and no discrimination is in fact occurring, then government is not in fact violating Justice O'Connor's basic premise that political standing should be
independent of religion. If the messages are true, then government is
violating that premise; but it is violating the premise by making religion relevant to political standing, not by sending messages which accurately acknowledge that fact. In this context, a doctrinal test or
principle which focuses upon the message, rather than upon the underlying evil reflected in that message, seems positively perverse.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's premise divorcing religion from political
standing does not logically lead to a "no endorsement" principle. Indeed, if taken literally, the proposition that religion should be irrelevant to political standing might even preclude such a principle.
Eligibility to receive public benefits is arguably an important component of one's standing in the political community. By invalidating
measures that are intended or perceived as endorsements of religion,
however, O'Connor's test impedes government from subsidizing or assisting religious interests to the same extent and with the same freedom that it subsidizes or assists other kinds of interests. In a real
sense, therefore, persons or institutions for whom such interests are
central are less eligible for public benefits than are citizens or institutions for whom religious interests are not central. 167 Government can
pay the salaries of school teachers - unless, that is, they choose to
teach in religious schools. 168 Congress can directly subsidize farmers
if it believes the public interest would be served (or even if farmers
simply have a strong enough lobby to exact a subsidy). But Congress
cannot on those grounds, or on any other grounds, directly subsidize
clergy or Christian missionary societies; such a subsidy would surely
be perceived as endorsing religion. Thus, taken at face value,
O'Connor's premise that religion should not be "relevant in any way"
to political standing not only fails to support a "no endorsement"
167. Cf Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the Supreme Court: The Mysterious
Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 207, 214 (1978) (for religious persons,
establishment decisions have resulted in "denial of full participation in the redistributive efforts
of the welfare state").
168. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); cf P. KAUPER, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1964) ("[I]f public funds are made available for all educational
institutions whether public or private except those that are under the control of a religious body,
it is indeed hard to avoid the conclusion that the religious factor is being used as a ground for
disqualification from public benefits.").
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principle, but indeed contradicts it. 169
If the goal of the establishment clause is to make political standing
independent of religion, therefore, the proper doctrinal direction seems
almost embarrassingly plain: The Supreme Court should develop doctrine which invalidates laws or practices that affect political or civil
rights on religious grounds. There is no apparent reason for the Court
instead to adopt a doctrinal test focusing upon an altogether different
factor which is at best a less than faithful proxy for the goal the Court
seeks to achieve.
D. Alienation and Messages of Exclusion
Even if Justice O'Connor has failed to link messages of endorsement to a diminution of actual political standing, one might still agree
with her contention that such messages are undesirable. It seems both
humane and politically expedient, after all, that government should
refrain from acting in ways that alienate some of it~ constituents by
making them feel like "outsiders," even if the political and civil rights
of such persons are not thereby diminished. Thus, a more sympathetic
response to Justice O'Connor's argument might suggest that the "no
endorsement" principle can be justified on the basis of a "nonalienation" policy, quite apart from any dubious linkage to "political
standing."
In evaluating this suggestion, a broader reference to more general
constitutional protections for belief and expression is helpful. The
Supreme Court has ruled that the freedom of belief is absolute; 170 and
the freedom of speech, though not absolute, has received rigorous doctrinal protection. 171 At the same time, the Constitution does not prevent government from adopting views and expressing judgments on a
vast range of subjects. 172 In making and expressing such judgments,
169. The foregoing analysis assumes that "standing in the political community" means something like enjoyment of the full rights and privileges of citizenship, including equal treatment
under state and federal law, and perhaps equal eligibility for public benefits. This conception
seems consistent with historical evidence suggesting that disestablishment made religion irrelevant to "civil rights." See note 158 supra. Justice O'Connor may have a different conception of
"political standing"; but if so, she has not articulated, nor is it easy to infer, just what that
conception is.
170. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
171. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin
publication of material allegedly affecting national security even though some Justices voting in
majority conceded that immediate and irreparable injury to the nation would follow); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (expanding protection for speech advocating violence).
172. Thomas Emerson observes that "the first amendment . . . has served to prevent the
government from prohibiting, harassing, or interfering with speech .... [It] has not been viewed
as a significant factor ... to impose limits on governmental participation in the system [of expression]." Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 795 (1981).
Although Emerson and others have sought to articulate limits on governmental speech, see also
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government inevitably endorses some beliefs, disapproves others, and
acts in ways that may cause some adherents of disfavored beliefs to
feel like "outsiders"; but that consequence hardly precludes government from making judgments. 173 Indeed, because governmental disapproval of the beliefs of particular citizens does not prevent such
citizens from voting, running for office, advocating their own positions, serving on juries, or claiming the full panoply of rights extended
by state and federal law, those citizens are considered to be fully protected in their freedoms of belief and expression.
Of course, some people may feel inhibited in matters of belief and
expression by the knowledge that particular positions have been endorsed or rejected by government; and someone conceivably might
propose that this inhibition be eliminated, and that the freedoms of
belief and expression be given even greater protection, through the
adoption of a prohibition forbidding governmental messages which
disapprove of the beliefs of some citizens and cause them to feel like
"outsiders." But such a proposal would be ill-conceived. Government
cannot act without making judgments; and such judgments will inevitably conflict with, and thereby imply disapproval of, 'the beliefs of
some citizens. Unless we are attracted to governmental paralysis,
therefore, we must reject any generalized nonalienation requirement.
Justice O'Connor's argument for forbidding messages that make
some people feel like "outsiders" on religious grounds, though directed at a narrower category of messages, is vulnerable to· a similar
objection. Religious diversity in this country is rich enough to ensure
that any governmental policy in an area that potentially concerns religion will probably alienate some people. If public institutions employ
religious symbols, persons who do not adhere to the predominant religion may feel like "outsiders." But if religious symbols are banned
M. YUOOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Shilfrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565 (1980); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979), such limits at present exist only in the realm of academic theory.
Cf Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress can subsidize lobbying activities of some organizations while denying subsidies to other such organizations); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (rejecting argument that speech clause limits government's
ability to fund political campaigns). Moreover, even if limits were actually adopted, they clearly
could not amount to a general prohibition on the formation and expression of judgments by
government, since the formation and expression of judgments is an inherent part of the process of
governing.
173. For instance, communists may regularly be made to feel like "outsiders" by government
pronouncements and actions condemning communism. In some states, and during some periods,
Democrats - or Republicans, or members of any other political party or persuasion - may be
made to feel like "outsiders" by government pronouncements disapproving their respective be·
liefs. The first amendment protects the right of all such persons and groups to hold and advocate
their beliefs; it does not impose any prohibition precluding government from acting in ways that
will disapprove their views and make them feel like "outsiders."
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from such contexts, some religious people will feel that their most central values and concerns - and thus, in an important sense, they
themselves - have been excluded from a public culture devoted
purely to secular concerns. Once again, Lynch is illustrative: Whether
the creche was included in or removed from the Christmas display, the
sincere religious sensibilities of some citizens would be offended. 174
Cogent or not, the polemics of what may be called the "religious
right" provide powerful evidence of the alienation and frustration generated by Supreme Court decisions that have excluded religious practices from some areas of public life, such as the schools, 175 and that
have established, in the view of some believers, an antireligious "secular humanism." 176
Indeed, alienation produced by Supreme Court decisions may be
even more severe than alienation provoked by actions oflegislatures or
lower government officials. Legislative or municipal action, after all,
represents temporary and possibly correctable policy - often of only a
particular state or municipality. Offensive constitutional decisions, on
the other hand, send a message telling the disfavored that their central
beliefs and values are incompatible with the fundamental and enduring
principles upon which the Republic rests.
Nearly everyone, of course, will feel greater sympathy for some
groups that have been alienated by government policies than for other
174. The plaintiffs in the case viewed the creche as an endorsement of Christianity. See note
132 supra. On the other hand, the attempt to remove the creche provoked an outpouring of
opposition, including a number of letters that were introduced at trial. The district court stated
that these letters "evidence a deep concern about and resentment for what most of the correspondents regarded as an attack on a cherished religious symbol. . . . Overall the tenor of the correspondence is that the lawsuit represents an attack on the presence of religion as part of the
community's life .... " Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981), ajfd., 691
F.2d 1029 (!st Cir. 1982), revd., 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Another current issue illustrating the difficulty is the question of whether student religious
groups should be permitted to meet in public schools on essentially the same terms as other
student groups. Compare Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises,
Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1986) (arguing that
permitting religious groups to meet communicates governmental support for religion), with Esbeck, Religion and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 71 (1984)
(condemning exclusion of religious student groups as "shamefully discriminatory").
175. Michael McConnell notes that the " 'religious right' argues that an entirely secular public school will be perceived by students as hostile toward religion." McConnell, Neutrality Under
the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 164 (1986). See also Schwarz, The Nonestablishment Principle: A Reply to Professor Giannel/a, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (1968) (noting
"the anti-religionism of the public schools").
176. The charge that the Supreme Court's religion clause decisions have established "secular
humanism" is not confined to fundamentalist preachers and right wing politicians, but has found
expression in the academic literature as well. See, e.g., Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral
Values: The Limits ofAmerican Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9-19 (Spring 1981);
Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979
B.Y.U. L. REV. 177; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion ofSecular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, IO TEX. TECH. L. REV. I (1978).
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such groups. Nor are such sympathies necessarily illegitimate; it may
be that adequate reasons can be given for concluding that the alienation felt by Jews, Moslems, agnostics, or other religious minorities is
constitutionally cognizable, whereas the alienation felt by Fundamentalist Christians should not influence constitutional policy (or vice
versa). Suppose, for instance, that a historian or constitutional theorist were to advance a compelling exposition and argument in favor of,
let us say, a theory of "strict separation." The exposition is so lucid
and the argument so compelling, we may suppose, that the "strict separation" construction gains general acceptance by virtually all judges
and scholars, and quickly becomes the law of the land. Nonetheless,
some groups would inevitably object to the content or consequences of
such a construction, perhaps because they believe that government
should support religion and that separation amounts to "political atheism." 177 We might conclude, however, that any alienation felt by such
groups, although perfectly sincere, should be disregarded because their
dissatisfaction actually results not from particular governmental actions but rather from the very meaning of the establishment clause.
We could, in other words, properly distinguish between groups who
are alienated by violations of the establishment clause and groups who
are offended by the establishment clause itself.
This possibility assumes, however, that a correct exposition of the
establishment clause would specify something other than prevention of
alienation as the clause's controlling purpose. Conversely, if the central purpose of the establishment clause is simply to prevent alienation
(and the messages which cause it), then the distinction between justified and unjustified alienation disappears. What is justified must be
determined, after all, by reference to the establishment clause. If the
purpose of the clause is simply to prevent alienation, then if government produces alienation, that fact alone demonstrates that the establishment clause has been violated.
Thus, an approach which emphasizes the prevention of alienation
as the purpose of the establishment clause is perhaps the only approach which, instead of grounding distinctions between justified and
unjustified complaints by alienated groups, in fact legitimates all such
complaints. And if virtually every governmental action or measure,
including a "no endorsement" test, 178 will alienate some persons on
religious grounds, then the nonalienation approach to the establishment clause is simply unworkable.
177. See J. MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF Goo 99-100 (1964) (describing modern notions of
church-state separation as "political atheism"').
178. See note 153 supra.
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In sum, the fact that citizens may sometimes feel like "outsiders,"
however unfortunate, does not provide a secure doctrinal foundation
for the protection either of belief and expression generally or of religious belief in particular. Ultimately, a degree of alienation must be
acknowledged as an inevitable cost of maintaining government in a
pluralistic culture. In such a culture, some beliefs must, but not all
beliefs can, achieve recognition and ratification in the nation's laws
and public policies; and those whose positions are not so favored will
sometimes feel like "outsiders." Because the phenomenon is inherent
in a pluralistic culture, the aspiration to abolish that phenomenon, or
to develop a conception of "political standing" that includes a right
not to feel like an "outsider," constitutes a utopian vision rather than a
realistic basis for formulating constitutional doctrine.
IV.

THE ALLURE OF NEUTRALITY

The foregoing analysis suggests that several possible justifications
for the "no endorsement" test, including the one suggested by Justice
O'Connor, are seriously flawed. But this conclusion produces a puzzle: If O'Connor's test is deficient as doctrine, and if the theoretical
justifications offered for the test are unpersuasive, then why has the
"no endorsement" proposal generated such widespread support? The
solution to this puzzle appears only when the test is viewed against the
backdrop of the long-standing quest to define a position of governmental neutrality towards religion.
A.

The Quest for Neutrality

It is hardly surprising that the idea of "neutrality" has exerted a
magnetic attraction in establishment analysis. History amply demonstrates that controversies over religious issues can be onerous on a
number of levels - theological, psychological, political - and it is
enticing to think that government might somehow remain aloof from
such controversies. The idea of neutrality appears to offer this possibility; it evokes the image of a government which can stand dispassionately above the fray, shunning involvement in religious disputes while
maintaining a fair and impartial stance that offends none of the parties
to such disputes.
Hence, in its first modern establishment case, the Supreme Court
committed itself to the ideal of neutrality. 179 Later cases fastened even
179. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947) (declaring that the establishment
clause "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers").

314

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

more firmly onto neutrality as the guiding principle for regulating
church-state relations; 180 and the emphasis upon neutrality was preserved through the adoption of the Lemon test. 181 In its most recent
term, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to neutrality as an establishment ideal. 182 Like the Court itself, countless commentators have
advocated neutrality as the fundamental tenet of the establishment
clause. 183
This pervasive commitment to neutrality has not yet generated any
clear and convincing account of what neutrality actually entails. It
has become increasingly clear, rather, that neutrality is a "coat of
many colors." 184 Thus far, the concept's protean character has not
noticeably undermined its appeal, and may even have enhanced it; virtually anyone can find a nostrum to his liking in the cabinet of neutrality. However, the slipperiness of the concept has impeded the
development of coherent and predictable doctrine. Everson v. Board of
Education 185 foreshado)Ved the confusion. The question in the case
was whether a state could pay for the cost of busing students to and
from parochial schools. All of the Justices wanted to find an answer
compatible with the idea of neutrality. However, some Justices
thought that since the state already transported public school students, neutrality required that parochial school students receive simi180. E.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-26 (1963).
18I. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971). The Court derived the "secular
purpose and effect" prongs of the Lemon test from the Schempp decision and the "entanglement"
prong from the Walz decision. Both of these decisions had emphasized the centrality of neutrality in establishment jurisprudence.
182. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2867 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn., 107 S. Ct.
1046, 1051 (1987).
183. E.g., Laycock, supra note 5, at 409; Braveman, supra note 16, at 353; Esbeck, supra note
174, at 68, 86; Beschle, supra note 45, at 174; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 325-26; Note, The Myth
of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 127-29, 166-67 (1985);
Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Jnterpretatio11 of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (1981) [hereinafter Columbia Note]; Bird, Freedom

from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public Sc/zoo/ Instruction and Religious Sc/zoo/ Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 125, 138 (1979); Wheeler, Establislz111e11t Clause Neutrality and
the Reasonable Acco111111odation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901, 911-14 (1977); Giannella, Religious Liberty, No11estab/islz111ent, and Doctrinal Development, Part fl· The Nonestablislzment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1968); W. KATZ, supra note 14, at 13; P.
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LA w 112 (1962); see also Johnson, supra note 112, at 818
("That in some sense the federal government and the states ought to be 'neutral' in religious
matters is undisputed ....").
184. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). For discussions distinguishing or categorizing different versions of neutrality, see Note, Government
Nonilzvolvement with Religious Institutio11s, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 921, 931-33 (1981); Wheeler,
supra note 183, at 911-15; M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 152-54 (1965); P.
KAUPER, supra note 168, at 70-76.
185. 330 U.S. l (1947).
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lar treatment, while other Justices believed the demands of neutrality
were fully satisfied by allowing all students to attend public school if
they chose. 186
The frequently noted inconsistency of results under the Lemon test
indicates that the essential indeterminacy remains as vigorous as ever.
Nor is the malady likely to be cured. If the problem were simply that
government lacks the will to adhere to a clear principle, as commentators occasionally suggest, 187 the case would be more hopeful. Steeling
itself to resist religious pressure and to disregard entrenched religious
traditions, the Supreme Court could simply force government to be
neutral. Indeed, even if the tension between the neutrality thought to
be required by the establishment clause and the accommodation demanded by the free exercise clause is taken into account, there might
still be room for hope; the Court just might hit upon a construction of
the free exercise clause that would reduce the tension. 188
Unfortunately, the root of the difficulty runs deeper still. Scholars
are coming to recognize that the very concept of neutrality is inherently indeterminate. 189 Professor John Valauri has recently argued
that establishment neutrality has been and must be understood to contain two components: noninvolvement and impartiality. In many contexts, however, these components push in opposite directions. Thus,
"[t]he concept of neutrality is indeterminate because it is irresolvably
and multiply ambiguous."190
Another sign of the conceptual breakdown is the disagreement
about the relationship between neutrality and other establishment values such as separation and voluntarism. The Everson Court supposed,
as have many commentators, that these values are harmonious and
186. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (majority opinion), with 330 U.S. at 58-60 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). For a more extensive discussion of the confusion evident in Everson with regard
to neutrality, see Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U.
PIIT. L. REV. 83, 94-104 (1986).
187. E.g., Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1466-77.
188. For instance, Justice Stevens has suggested that there should be "virtually no room" for
constitutionally required exemptions from laws that are neutral towards religion in their general
application. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). Whatever
its other merits or drawbacks, Stevens' position would at least reduce the need to qualify establishment neutrality in order to satisfy free exercise requirements, since the free exercise clause
would no longer impose any significant requirements beyond "neutrality."
189. Doubts about the coherence of neutrality as a value are not limited to the role of that
value in church-state jurisprudence. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 40-47 (1984); Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591 (1983);
Hyde, Is Liberalism Possible? (Book Review), 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1036-41 (1982).
190. Valauri, supra note 186, at 93. See generally id. at 84-128. See also McConnell, supra
note 175, at 161-64 (arguing that where government has a pervasive presence, neutrality is impossible because even "a government practice of 'strict neutrality' ... is not truly neutral").
)
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mutually supporting, 191 but critics argue that such values are in fact
often incompatible. 192 In a similar vein, neutrality is said by some to
require "accommodation" of religion, and by others to forbid it. 193
The quest for neutrality has thus created a conundrum. We require government to be neutral. But our attempts to say what neutrality means tum out to be indeterminate and deeply ambiguous.
B.

The Jurisprudence of Symbolism

At this point, the neutrality enterprise may enlist in its aid a proposal that can be described as the "jurisprudence of symbolism." This
proposal urges that in applying the establishment clause, the judiciary
should be less concerned about whether a law actually benefits religion, but should invalidate measures that appear to favor religion.
Professor William Marshall, who has advanced the most thoughtful
and systematic version of this position, explains that "a jurisprudence
that is primarily 'symbolic' and not 'substantive' [is] ... concerned less
with the substantive goal of limiting certain types of government involvements and supports of religion than with eliminating the perception of improper government action." 194
191. Everson emphatically favored all of these values, seemingly regarding them not only as
consistent but as almost interchangeable. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 ("individual religious lib·
erty"); 330 U.S. at 13 ("religious liberty"); 330 U.S. at 16 ("wall of separation"); 330 U.S. at 18
(neutrality, separation). See also Laycock, supra note 18, at 7 (separationists agree that govern·
ment should be neutral); Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1463 (equating strict separation with
strict neutrality).
192. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 175, at 147 (separation value not neutral); id. at 151
(religious liberty requires departures from neutrality); Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Sec·
ular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 686-87 (showing tension
between values of separation, voluntarism, and neutrality).
193. Compare Cornelius, supra note 10, at 36 (neutrality requires accommodation), and J.
WHITEHEAD, THE FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 10-17
(1983) (same), with Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1474-75 ("strict neutrality" precludes aid
to religion). See also P. KAUPER, supra note 168, at 70-75 (arguing that accommodation modi·
fies neutrality).
194. Marshall, supra note 45, at 498 (emphasis added). Marshall illustrates the distinction as
follows: "[A]ssume a state provides direct financial payment to a minister. The establishment
harm is not in the payment. It is in what the payment symbolizes." Id. at 513. Under this
approach, "programs with only minimally favorable religious effects may create establishment
problems, while programs with highly substantial effects may not." Id. at 531-32.
Although Marshall has provided the most developed exposition of the jurisprudence of sym·
bolism, he is certainly not its only advocate. The Supreme Court has exhibited an increasing
concern with the symbolic consequences of establishment doctrine and decisions. See text at
notes 201-06 infra. So have other academic commentators. See, e.g.. Kurland, supra note 11, at
6 (arguing that church-state issues "may be more important as symbols than for pragmatic rca·
sons"); Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Co11stitutio11, 1984 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 509 (adopting symbolic approach, but arguing that some use of religious symbols should be
permitted); L. TRIBE, supra note 115, at 843-44 (emphasizing importance of "symbolic impact"
in assessing aid to religious schools); Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1689-93 (emphasizing
importance of "symbolic linkage" in establishment decisions).
Likewise, although wary of giving constitutional protection to symbols, see Johnson, supra
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The jurisprudence of symbolism seeks to solve the problem of defining actual neutrality by skirting it: Since experience shows that we
cannot agree upon what neutrality actually is, perhaps we should table
the matter, and instead concern ourselves with whether governmental
action appears to be, or not to be, neutral. 195 Thus, the argument for a
symbolic jurisprudence begins by showing the impossibility of resolving establishment problems on the basis of "substantive" principles. 19 6
The argument then holds out the jurisprudence of symbolism as the
avenue of escape from these analytical difficulties. 197 Although advocates of this approach have not spelled out as clearly as one might
wish just how the jurisprudence of symbolism escapes conceptual difficulties, the underlying logic of their position can be extrapolated. The
invitation to adopt the appearance of neutrality as the dispositive criterion is seductive because it seemingly requires us only to know our
own minds and perceptions. Perhaps we cannot define just what it
would mean for government to be neutral; but surely we can at least
say when an action appears to be neutral.
In this respect, the jurisprudence of symbolism is reminiscent of
broader philosophical attempts to overcome difficulties in achieving
knowledge of the external world by turning inward and adopting our
own perceptions as the proper objects of immediate knowledge. The
"sense datum" approach to knowledge advocated by phenomenalistic
philosophers in the first half of this century illustrates the strategy. 198
note 112, at 831, Phillip Johnson stresses the importance of appearances; he argues that
"[g]ovemment must seem to be evenhanded about religious disputes. What it does may coincide
with the wishes of some groups and thwart the plans of others, but this coincidence must seem to
be the outcome of neutral principles or fair-minded interest balancing, rather than conscious
partisanship ... ."Id. at 845 (emphasis added). Perhaps remembering that he has elsewhere
criticized "sham neutrality" by the courts, Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36
STAN. L. REV. 247, 266-80 (1984), Johnson hastens to add that "[t]he emphasis upon neutrality
is not necessarily deceptive." Johnson, supra note 112, at 845. In view of Johnson's bleak depiction of the possibility of articulating neutral principles in this area, id. at 820-39, however, it is
hard to see how a decision that would "seem to be the outcome of neutral principles" could be
anything but deceptive.
195. Like Justice O'Connor, Marshall explicitly refers to "endorsement," not "neutrality," as
his central concern. Marshall, supra note 45, at 513. A concern about preventing "endorsement"
of religion, however, can best be understood as an expression of the goal of maintaining symbolic
neutrality toward religion. See note 210 infra and accompanying text.
196. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 500-03. Marshall concludes that ''.[e]stablishment principles are simply not susceptible to consistent implementation." Id. at 513. Johnson similarly
observes that establishment doctrine is "radically indeterminate" and that "the doctrinal objectives are inherently contradictory." Johnson, supra note 112, at 820, 839.
197. Marshall asserts that "a symbolic approach absorbs the tensions within establishment'"
and suggests that Justice O'Connor's Lynch opinion demonstrates how this reconciliation occurs.
Marshall, supra note 45, at 532. In light of the outrage generated by Lynch. and the insistence by
many critics that the creche was clearly an endorsement of Christianity, see notes 15-19 & 132
supra and accompanying text, this claim is at least a courageous one.
198. See, e.g., A.J. AYER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE (1940); B. RUSSELL, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 75-134 (2d ed. 1929).
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Such philosophers argued that by focusing on perceptual phenomena
we can achieve certainty, at least in some matters. 199 If I say, "A cow
is standing by the barn," my assertion may be wrong. The animal
standing by the barn may be a horse. Or there may be nothing "out
there" at all; I may be hallucinating. But if I say, "I see a brown
patch," I cannot be wrong, since I am only making an assertion regarding my own sense perceptions, about which I can hardly be mistaken. 200 At least, so the argument runs.
Arguments for an establishment doctrine that focuses on appearances or perceptions evince a similar logic. If I say that government is,
or is not, acting neutrally, someone may - and usually will - disagree. But if I merely say that government appears (to me) to be acting
neutrally, how can anyone contradict me? Of course, as soon as I
make the broader assertion that a law appears neutral not only to me
but to people generally, or to a "reasonable" or "objective" observer,
the possibility of disagreement is revived. Still, no one can plausibly
dispute (can anyone?) that I have at least described how the law appears to me; and the very fact that the law appears neutral to me
should at least count as evidence for the more unqualified assertion
about how the law "appears." Most importantly, my assertion that a
law "appears" neutral cannot be refuted by arguments showing that in
some sense the law is not actually neutral, since my assertion does not
purport to say anything about the law's actual neutrality. Thus, the
shift to a phenomenalistic doctrine which focuses upon the symbolic
aspects of governmental action seems to offer a less vulnerable foundation for making assertions and drawing conclusions, while eliminating
the necessity of defining what neutrality actually is.
199. A.J. Ayer contended that a sense-datum proposition is "incorrigible," or incapable of
being falsified, because "it is completely verified by the existence of the sense-datum which it
describes; and so it is inferred that to doubt the truth of such a proposition is not merely irrational but meaningless." A.J. AYER, supra note 198, at 83. Bertrand Russell argued that the
"hardest of hard data" consist of sense data and logical truths, and that to doubt such data
would be "pathological." B. RUSSELL, supra note 198, at 75.
200. H.H. Price expressed the argument illustratively:
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato
that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any
material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps
I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there
exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of
other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is
directly present to my consciousness. What the red patch is, whether a substance, or a state
of a substance, or an event, whether it is physical or psychical or neither, are questions that
we may doubt about. But that something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt.
Whether the something persists even for a moment before and after it is present to my
consciousness, whether other minds can be conscious of it as well as I, may be doubted. But
that it now exists, and that I am conscious of it - by me at least who am conscious of it this
cannot possibly be doubted.
H. PRICE, PERCEPTION 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1950) (emphasis in original) {footnote omitted).
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The "No Endorsement" Test as an Expression
of Symbolic Neutrality

Justice O'Connor is not the first jurist to be drawn to the jurisprudence of symbolism. Professor Marshall argues that a large number of
seemingly inconsistent establishment decisions can be reconciled on
symbolic grounds. 201 Whether Marshall's proffered reconciliations are
persuasive is perhaps debatable; a severe reader might instead view
Marshall's analysis as powerful evidence for his later observation that
"a symbolic theory is ... subject to extraordinary manipulation." 2 0 2
Recently, however, the Supreme Court's occasional concern for symbolism has become explicit. Thus, although programs subsidizing religious schools may be unconstitutional, 203 functionally similar
programs have been upheld when monetary aid is given directly to the
students, or to their parents, rather than to the school itself. 204 By
eliminating the religious institution as the direct recipient of state
funds, the Court has said, such programs avoid communicating an
"imprimatur of State approval" for the institution. 205 And the Court
has emphasized the importance in evaluating school aid programs of
"symbolic impact" and of a possible "symbolic union of government
and religion. " 206
Although the current Lemon test may be loose enough to permit
consideration of symbolic factors, however, the test's emphasis upon
the "principal or primary effect" of a law more naturally encompasses
the law's substantive consequences, not merely the appearances it creates. The test as verbalized retains a commitment to actual neutrality,
not merely to symbolic neutrality. Consequently, an opinion explaining why a law is neutral in appearance can still be embarrassed by the
objection that the law in fact confers sizable material benefits on religion, and thereby deviates from actual neutrality. 207
Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test removes this embarrass201. Marshall, supra note 45, at 514-31.
202. Id. at 533.
203. E.g.. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Publi~ Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
204. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also Witters v. Washington Dept. ofServs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reversing Washington decision which invalidated grant of vocational aid to blind student studying for the ministry).
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
206. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390-92 (1985).
207. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that although
school aid program was facially neutral, about 96% of parents eligible for tuition deduction sent
their children to religious schools).
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ment by carefully embracing the jurisprudence of symbolism. 208 The
shift is most conspicuous in the test's second prong, which inquires
into the perceptions or appearances that a law creates while conceding
the possible constitutionality of a law that "in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion." 209 More fundamentally, the concern for symbolism is inherent in the very notion of
"endorsement," and in the pervasive concern about "messages" rather
than material consequences. Thus, even under the test's first prong,
the question is not whether government intends to aid religion. Discussing the permissibility of aid would inevitably involve courts in a
debate about what neutrality is; and that is a debate which the "no
endorsement" test studiously shuns. Instead, the first prong asks
whether government has intended to endorse religion - which may
naturally be understood as a way of asking whether government has
attempted to depart from an attitude, or appearance, of neutrality.
In essence, Justice O'Connor's test imposes upon government the
obligation to maintain an appearance of neutrality toward religion.210
Government acts improperly both when it consciously seeks to violate
that obligation and when, 'intentionally or not, it in fact acts in ways
that do not seem neutral. Thus, maintaining the appearance of neutrality is the central concern in both the "intent" and "perception"
prongs of O'Connor's test.
V.

SYMBOL OR ILLUSION? THE EMPTINESS OF NEUTRALITY AS
AN EsTABLISHMENT IDEAL

The "no endorsement" test brings to culmination two important
themes in contemporary church-state analysis: the quest for neutrality, and the jurisprudence of symbolism which supplements that quest
and seeks to rescue it from the conundrum caused by the inability to
articulate what neutrality actually means. Those themes represent
powerful currents in contemporary thinking about the establishment
208. "[T]he thrust of her analysis is the search for symbolic meaning." Marshall, supra note
45, at 517.
209. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. As discussed above, the justification offered by Justice O'Connor for her proposal docs
not explicitly rest upon the ideal of neutrality; O'Connor has expressed reservations about
whether the notion of neutrality can fully reconcile the perceived tensions between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985). However, commentators favorable to O'Connor's approach have recognized that the appeal of the test lies in its
attempt to implement the ideal of neutrality. See Braveman, supra note 16, at 385 ("the endorsement test looks very similar to the neutrality principle"); Lacey, supra note 45, at 654 (linking
proposed prohibition against "symbolic aid to religion" with assumption that "the Constitution
requires neutrality towards religion"); Loewy, supra note 45, at 1049-51; Beschlc, supra note 45,
at 174-75; Strossen, supra note 45, at 373 n.218.
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clause; and by situating itself squarely in the middle of those currents,
the "no endorsement" test has been carried forward by the stream.
Where those currents will ultimately lead, however, is a question that
deserves further consideration.
A.

The Failure of the Phenomenalistic Strategy

The foregoing analysis has suggested that the jurisprudence of
symbolism seeks to avoid the failures of earlier efforts to define the
concept of neutrality by dropping the attempt to describe what governmental neutrality toward religion is, and instead focusing upon
whether government appears to be acting neutrally. This strategy parallels the sense-datum turn in theory of knowledge, which disowned
the effort to obtain immediate knowledge of external objects as things
in themselves, and instead adopted human perceptions, or sense data,
as the proper objects of direct knowledge. However, the sense-datum
theory has been powerfully criticized, 211 and at least one of those criticisms applies forcefully to the "no endorsement" strategy.
Responding to the contention that sense-datum sentences such as
"I see magenta now" are "incorrigible," or incapable of being falsified,
the analytic philosopher J.L. Austin pointed out that such sentences
may be false because the speaker may use words incorrectly. "I may
say 'Magenta' wrongly," Austin observed, "either by a mere slip, having meant to say 'Vermillion'; or because I don't know quite what 'magenta' means, what shade of colour is called magenta .... " 212 With
respect to sense-datum statements such as "I see magenta," the kind of
error identified by Austin may seem to be technically possible but easily avoidable in practice; and Austin acknowledged as much. We can
prevent such mistakes by being sure we know what "magenta" means
before we use the word, and then by attending carefully to our
perceptions.
However, the problem identified by Austin becomes much more
persistent when we make assertions that government appears, or does
not appear, to be acting neutrally with respect to religion. As Austin's
argument makes clear, even statements about how things "appear"
presuppose that we understand the meaning of the words we are using.
At most, therefore, statements about appearances might permit us to
avoid determining whether our perceptions correspond to some exter211. See generally w. SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY 127-96 (1963); J.L.
AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA (1962); G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT Of MIND 210-22 (1949).
212. J.L. AUSTIN, supra note 211, at 113 (emphasis added). Although he disagreed with
Austin over the significance of such errors, Ayer conceded the possibility of "verbal errors" even
in sense-datum statements. A.J. A YER, supra note 198, at 81-84.
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nal reality; such statements do nothing to eliminate confusion that inheres in the words or concepts we use. As noted earlier, however,
efforts to define what the concept of neutrality means in practice have
been notoriously unsuccessful. 213 But if we are not sure what neutrality means, then we cannot confidently make statements about whether
government appears to be acting neutrally. So long as we are not sure
what a position of neutrality is, in other words, we cannot say whether
government appears to be adhering to such a position. Indeed, so long
as the concept of neutrality remains fuzzy and ambiguous, we cannot
be sure when we use the word that we are really even communicating,
or that we are talking coherently at all.
Consider once again the Everson problem: Does the state act neutrally when it pays to bus children to parochial school? Some of the
Justices argued that the policy was not neutral because it involved government in religion, gave assistance to religion, and facilitated religious activities. Other Justices argued that the state's policy was
neutral because it merely put religious school students on an equal
footing with public school students, whose transportation costs were
also paid by the state.214 These positions obviously reflected differing
conceptions of neutrality. The critical issue at this point is whether
such disagreements might be reconciled, or at least avoided, by abandoning the question of whether the state's policy is neutral and instead
asking whether the policy appears to be neutral. And the obvious answer is that amending the question to ask about appearances does not
even touch the problem; the disagreement over what neutrality means
remains as lively as ever. If neutrality means noninvolvement, or "no
aid," then the state policy both is and appears to be a violation of
neutrality. Conversely, if neutrality means giving religious school children the same assistance that public school children receive, then the
policy is and appears to be neutral. The meaning of neutrality remains
unclear; what is clear is that asking about symbolic rather than actual
neutrality does not advance the discussion at all. 2 1s
Professor Marshall acknowledges this difficulty, though in other
terms, when he asserts that "in a pluralistic culture, there is often no
shared consensus of symbolic meaning," and that "how endorsement
is perceived depends largely upon one's initial outlook." 216 Nor does
213. See notes 184-93 supra and accompanying text.
214. See notes 185-86 supra and accompanying text.
215. Altering doctrine so as to emphasize perceptions or appearances might be helpful ir
people generally agreed about what the state may properly do but frequently disagreed about
what the state is in fact doing. As Everson illustrates, however, that is not the nature of most
establishment controversies.
216. Marshall, supra note 45, at 533-34.
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he try to wish this problem away, as Justice O'Connor does, by hypothesizing an "objective observer" in whom divergent perspectives
will inexplicably be reconciled or submerged. Indeed, he effectively
criticizes the attempts of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan
to resolve the problem.211
But Marshall offers no other persuasive solution to the problem of
divergent perspectives. He suggests that "if the Court can agree upon
the appropriate initial perspective to employ in establishment cases,
the range of individualized interpretations will be profoundly limited. "218 But this suggestion is not helpful. Of course establishment
problems would be less intractable if we could identify the appropriate
initial perspective, or conception of neutrality, from which to approach those problems. But that is precisely the difficulty: Because
perspectives are in fact incurably diverse, a policy against creating perceptions that government has endorsed or disapproved of religion can
provide no grounds for identifying one perspective, or one conception
of neutrality, as correct.
To be sure, the Court could prescribe an "ardent separationist"
perspective with respect to public schools, an "accommodationist"
perspective for reviewing governmental practices and regulations, and
a perspective of "qualified neutrality" for considering aid to parochial
education, as Marshall recommends. 219 But why should the Court
embrace those perspectives? One answer might assert that the perspectives Marshall prescribes are appropriate because they are the perspectives that most people in fact assume in such contexts. But this is
not Marshall's answer. He recognizes that the broad diversity of perspectives in a pluralistic culture makes consensus on appropriate perspectives unlikely, 220 and that even if most people did agree upon
particular perspectives, the majority view would not have any good
claim to control.221
Because Marshall cannot argue that his favored perspectives represent any de facto consensus, he is forced to contend that adopting such
perspectives would lead to sound results as measured by criteria other
than actual perceptions of endorsement. Thus, Marshall emphasizes
that adoption of the prescribed perspectives would maintain continuity
217. Id. at 535-37.
218. Id. at 538.
219. Id. at 541, 545, 548. Of course, whether the conception of "qualified neutrality" is any
more helpful than other conceptions of neutrality that the Court and commentators have advocated is questionable.
220. Id. at 533-34.
221. Id. at 535.
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with past decisions. 222 He also refers to other policies, such as recognizing our cultural heritage, and avoiding church-state entanglement. 223 Such policies are hardly new, of course, and they have not in
the past led to coherent doctrine or consistent decisions. But the more
important point is that these justifications for Marshall's prescribed
perspectives have little to do with the supposed significance of perceptions, symbolism, and endorsement. Symbolism and perceptions,
rather, turn out to be simply inconclusive, while other policies such as
stare decisis in fact become dispositive.
Admittedly, Marshall attempts to link some of these independent
policies back to a concern about actual endorsement; but the attempt
is unpersuasive. He suggests, for instance, that government practices
consistent with our "cultural heritage" should be permitted, and tries
to square this conclusion with the proposed prohibition on endorsement by suggesting that, if a public practice is part of our cultural
heritage, it will not be perceived as an improper endorsement of religion. Thus, "an adjustment for 'cultural heritage' " can be "built into
the establishment equation [as] ... a part of the relevant frame of
reference from which endorsement or non-endorsement would be perceived. "224 But if this argument is supposed to relate cultural heritage
to actual perceptions of endorsement, then the argument rests upon a
false dichotomy. There is no reason to suppose that a particular practice or message touching upon religion must either reflect our cultural
heritage or endorse religion; it may do both. 225 Indeed, since our cultural heritage surely includes religious traditions, including the tradition of governmental endorsement of religion, 22 6 many practices
undoubtedly will do both. Marshall's argument that actions consistent
with cultural heritage will not be seen as endorsements leads to a paradoxical conclusion: In a strongly religious culture in which pervasive
and overt governmental support for religion is taken for granted, government will never endorse religion. Conversely, the less religious government and culture become, the more likely it is that government will
violate the establishment clause by endorsing religion. 227
222. Id. at 539-41.
223. Id. at 542, 546.
224. Id. at 532.
225. Marshall here duplicates Justice O'Connor's error of treating "accommodation" and
"endorsement" as creating a dichotomy, rather than as concepts that in practice will usually
overlap. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 139-42 supra and accompanying text.
227. Nor can Marshall save the point by suggesting that actions consistent with our cultural
heritage will be seen as endorsements but not as "improperly endorsing religion." Marshall,
supra note 45, at 532 (emphasis added). In the first place, such actions will be seen by many as
improper, as the reaction to Lynch demonstrates. Moreover, if the establishment clause does not
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In sum, Marshall's argument begins by asserting that the Supreme

Court should invalidate laws that create perceptions of endorsement.
Marshall then concedes that perceptions of endorsement depend upon
perspectives, which in a pluralistic culture may vary considerably
from person to person. Thus, the criterion of perceptions, or symbolic
impact, will rarely indicate whether a law or practice is constitutional;
instead, that criterion will point both ways in nearly every case. Marshall's argument then pretends to resolve the impasse by recommending particular perspectives for particular problems, not because
these perspectives describe what people will actually perceive - in
each case, some people will perceive endorsement, and some won't but because the perspectives will generate results consistent with other
sound policies, such as stare decisis and maintenance of our cultural
heritage. But then why not just identify and adopt such other sound
policies in the first place? Despite all the discussion of symbolism and
perceptions, those factors ultimately seem to be little more than a
fagade for decisions actually to be made on other grounds ushered in
through the back door. 22s
Thus, the neutrality attained through symbolism turns out to be
illusory. We cannot achieve the appearance of neutrality unless we
first know what actual neutrality means. But if we knew what actual
neutrality meant, why would we be content with a merely symbolic
neutrality?
B.

Neutrality as a Parasitic Concept

The problems both with the "no endorsement" test and with the
jurisprudence of symbolism can be traced to a common cause: the concept of neutrality. That concept, paradoxically, appears to be both
irresistible and yet so indeterminate as to be almost meaningless. But
how can an idea be at once indispensable and useless?
forbid "endorsement," but only "improper" endorsement, then the basic question which Marshall purports to answer once again becomes wide open: What, under the establishment clause,
may government "properly" do?
228. Unlike Marshall, Professor Johnson does not prescribe particular perspectives for assessing the appearances or perceptions created by government policies. He implies, rather, that
all perspectives should be taken into account, and suggests that government can appear neutral
by siding sometimes with one position and sometimes with an opposing position, thereby avoiding the appearance of any uniform or systematic favoritism. Johnson, supra note 112, at 839-41.
Johnson argues that current doctrine, despite its analytical deficiencies, may serve satisfactorily if
applied in a spirit of fairness and compromise. Id. at 839-40, 845-46. More recently, Marshall
likewise appears to have moved toward such a position favoring symbolic neutrality in the aggregate. Marshall, Unprecedemial Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM.&. MARYL. REV. 925, 929
(1986). The hope is that such an approach will make everyone at least partly happy. The current
state of consternation over Lemon, however, see notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text, at least
suggests the possibility that such an approach will in fact leave everyone deeply unhappy.
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Neutrality and the Judge

In an effort to dissolve that paradox, it is helpful to begin by exploring what neutrality means in a context where it is somewhat more
familiar. In deciding cases, judges are expected to be neutral; judicial
neutrality might therefore serve as a useful analogue to the neutrality
one might ask of the state generally in matters of religion. 229 Suppose
that a newly appointed judge must decide a contract case between a
prosperous merchant and a cancer-affiicted widow. Although the
judge knows very little about the case at this point, she is well acquainted with her own predispositions; she knows that she is generally
sympathetic to widows and to cancer victims, and that she has no
great fondness for merchants. She does not apologize for these predispositions, but believes she could articulate plausible reasons for holding them. At the same time, the judge believes she is obligated to act
neutrally, both in the way she conducts the proceedings and in the
way she ultimately decides the case. She therefore asks us, her law
clerks or advisers, to explain, first, what neutrality means and, second,
how the idea of neutrality should guide her in conducting and deciding
the case.
In answering the first question, we might begin by suggesting that
neutrality means the judge should not favor or aid either party to the
dispute. This "no favoritism" version of neutrality is probably correct
in some sense. But it may also be badly misleading. During the
course of the proceedings, the judge will be asked to rule on numerous
motions regarding discovery, the conduct of the trial, the admissibility
of evidence, jury instructions, and other matters. In granting or denying such motions, the judge will inevitably rule "in favor of," and will
thereby give assistance to, one party or the other. Similarly, at the
conclusion of the case the judge will be expected to enter a judgment
"in favor of" one of the parties. Taken too literally, a version of neutrality which forbids "favoring" either party might prevent the judge
from performing these essential tasks.
If the judge were to raise this concern, we would of course assure
her that our admonition against favoring either party does not mean
she cannot rule in their favor on motions or in her final judgment. But
then what exactly does the admonition mean? The "no favoritism"
229. Cf Beschle, supra note 45, at 174 (comparing establishment neutrality to that required
of a "judge or an umpire"). Of course, since conceptions of neutrality differ, the analogy will not
be equally pertinent to every conception, and some conceptions might therefore be immune to
the analysis which follows. I would suggest, however, that exploring the analogy to judicial
neutrality helps to identify a core sense of neutrality which underlies the appeal the concept has
exhibited.
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version of neutrality obviously must be qualified to mean only that
some kinds of favoring are forbidden. But the qualified version simply

reformulates the original question: What kinds of favoring does neutrality forbid?
A related response might seek to answer this question by proposing
that neutrality means equal treatment. Thus, the judge, in ruling upon
motions and in deciding the case, may favor or aid the parties so long
as she treats them equally. But this explanation, like the previous one,
is acceptable only if understood in some qualified sense that the explanation itself fails to articulate. Taken literally, the "equal treatment"
version of neutrality might lead to absurd results. If the judge grants
ten evidentiary objections made by the widow, can the merchant plausibly argue that equal treatment requires the judge to grant ten of his
evidentiary objections? And what would it mean for the final judgment to treat the parties equally? Must each party receive half of the
relief that he or she is seeking?
The "no favoritism" and "equal treatment" proposals thus force us
to consider the further questions: What kinds of "favoring" does neu.:
trality forbid? In what sense should a judge treat the parties equally?
Those questions may lead to the following answer. The bodies of law
known as civil procedure and evidence prescribe rules or criteria that
the judge should look to in conducting a case and in admitting or excluding evidence. Likewise, the law of contracts contains rules or criteria that should guide the judge in deciding whether a valid and
enforceable contract exists. Neutrality means that in conducting the
proceeding, and ultimately in deciding the case, the judge should act
only upon the basis of proper rules or criteria, rather than upon other
factors that the law regards as extraneous or improper. There are, in
other words, factors that the law deems to be proper bases for a decision, and other factors that are not considered by the law to be germane. So long as the judge bases her decisions upon proper
considerations, she can be said to be acting neutrally. 230
This explanation of neutrality gives content and scope to the incomplete and potentially misleading definitions considered earlier.
Strictly speaking, the assertion that the judge must not favor od1ssist
widows is simply not true. The widow may prevail on the merits, and
230. Often, of course, the propriety of considering particular factors may be debatable. If the
judge consults a particular factor which she considers properly relevant, critics of the decision
may argue that she acted incorrectly because the factor should not be relevant. Charges that the
judge did not act "neutrally," by contrast, are most likely to be made in cases in which the judge
is believed to have been influenced by factors that everyone, including the judge herself, would
agree to be improper, such as personal sympathy or aversion to one of the parties, or a personal
stake in the outcome.
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the judge must then issue a judgment in her favor - a judgment that
may provide substantial assistance to her. The "no favoritism" version of neutrality is acceptable, however, if it is understood to mean
that the judge must not favor or assist either party except in accordance with proper criteria. Similarly, the judge treats the parties equally
if she favors or disfavors them only upon the basis of proper criteria.
Thus, she may treat the merchant ·equally even though she denies
every one of his motions and issues judgment against him, so long as
those decisions are based upon the criteria prescribed by the law. 231
It seems most helpful, in sum, to understand neutrality not as "no
favoritism" or equal treatment - although those definitions, properly
qualified, may be correct - but rather as adherence to accepted or
proper criteria of decision. Having offered that response to the judge's
first question, we must now consider her second question: How does
the concept of neutrality guide the judge in conducting the proceedings and deciding the case? And the unhappy answer seems to be that
the concept is of no help at all. If the judge knows what the proper
rules or criteria for decision are, the neutrality norm tells her that she
should act on the basis of those rules or criteria. But that counsel is
superfluous; if the judge already knows that such criteria are the
proper bases for her decision, we add nothing to her knowledge by
telling her she should act upon such criteria. On the other hand, if the
judge does not already know what the proper criteria for decision are,
telling her to be neutral will leave her as much in the dark as ever
about how to conduct and decide the case.
It might seem that neutrality at least cancels out the judge's initial
predispositions or prejudices by telling her that she must not decide
the case for the widow because she is a widow, or against the merchant
because he is a merchant. But even those prohibitions cannot be deduced from the concept of neutrality. Rather, they derive from the
fact that widowhood and merchanthood are not included among the
substantive criteria that the law deems proper bases for a decision. To
the extent that the law does make a party's merchant status relevant, 232 the merchant cannot complain if that status influences the
judge, just as he could not complain, when the evidence shows he de231.~ The same point can be made about the neutrality expected of an umpire or referee in an
athletic contest. The umpire is expected to enforce the rules in an evenhanded fashion. So long
as the judge acts consistently in accordance with the rules, he can be said to have treated each
side fairly and equally, even if most of the infractions happen to be committed by and called
against one of the sides.

232. For instance, decisions in cases under the Uniform Commercial Code may properly turn
on whether the seller of goods is a .. merchant." See I W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAi
GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE JO, 70, 238 (1964).
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frauded the widow, that the judge violated neutrality by deciding the
case against him just because he was a defrauder. The concept of neutrality, in short, provides no independent guidance to the judge, but
merely reaffirms the substantive law upon which it is parasitic.
Although the concept of neutrality provides little practical assistance to the judge in deciding a case, however, it hardly follows that the
concept is inapplicable to the judge, or that it deserves to be repudiated. On the contrary, the assertion that the judge should be neutral is
still perfectly, and indeed tautologically, true. Conversely, it would be
perverse and even self-contradictory to suggest that the judge need not
act neutrally; the suggestion would amount to asserting, illogically,
that a judge may properly base a decision upon improper criteria.
Neutrality, in short, remains an essential judicial virtue. Moreover,
the concept has value in discourse about judging; when we believe that
a judge has acted upon a criterion that is generally regarded as an
impermissible basis for decision, such as personal sympathy or aversion, we can intelligibly express that criticism by saying that the judge
has violated the obligation of neutrality. What the concept cannot do,
however, is supply the substantive rules or criteria which guide judicial decisionmaking.
2.

The Analogy Applied -

Neutrality and Religion

Applied to the problem of church-state relations, this analysis of
neutrality helps to explain why the concept is so irresistible and yet so
apparently barren, and even productive of confusion. Just. as neutrality forbids the judge to "favor" either party to a dispute, neutrality
precludes the state from "favoring" either religion or nonreligion. 233
As with judicial neutrality, however, that explanation is not especially
helpful. Government inevitably must act in myriad ways that help or
hinder religious or nonreligious interests. Laws often reinforce aspects
of morality favored by some religions234 but burden other religious
practices. Public education equips children to read scriptures; it may
also contradict, displace, or weaken particular religious beliefs. Fire
departments put out fires in churches - and in nightclubs and casinos. Roads maintained by the state facilitate travel to church services
- and to recreation that draws people away from church services. Of
233. Cf Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (neutrality means "no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion" (quoting Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring))).
234. See Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating Law and Religion in the Secular
State, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1095, 1096 (1986) ("[M]any criminal laws, as well as many laws
governing family relations or touching on other moral concerns, are congruent with and often
derived from the insights of the J udeo-Christian faiths.").
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course, many public measures do not deliberately seek to help or hinder religion (although they in fact help or hinder religion nonetheless);
but some do. Governments grant conscientious objector status, or require employers to accommodate their employees' religious concerns.
Thus, in one sense, government constantly and inevitably both favors and disfavors - and assists and inhibits - religion. Even as we
insist that government must not aid or favor religion, we instinctively
sense that the extension of police and fire protection to churches does
not fall within the prohibition. But why not? The problem with the
"no favoritism" version of neutrality is that it is too gross; in its apparent absoluteness it gives no guidance as to what kinds of favoring are
permissible and what kinds are not. Moreover, this account of neutrality is not only misleading but dangerous, since there is no assurance that someone, including a judge, might not take it at face value.
The consequence of that course can only be confusion.
Likewise, neutrality means that government must in some sense
extend equal treatment to differing religions, as well as to religion and
nonreligion. 235 But that admonition surely cannot mean that government must somehow equalize the public benefits and burdens conferred and imposed upon religion and nonreligion. Such a
requirement is not merely impracticable; it is unintelligible. How
would we know what to count as religious and nonreligious interests,
and how would we aggregate and compare the benefits received and
the burdens incurred by each? If government decides to subsidize
farmers, must it equally subsidize clergy? (In total dollars? In proportion to their respective numbers? Their respective needs?) If money is
allocated to enhancing the nation's war-making capacity, must matching funds be set aside to support the promulgation of the Gospel? A
plausible account of establishment neutrality cannot require us to ask,
much less answer, such questions.
A more adequate statement of neutrality would assert that neutrality requires government, like the judge, to act in matters that affect
religion only upon proper criteria. So long as it acts upon proper criteria, government can be regarded as avoiding improper favoritism and
as treating religion and nonreligion equally. But this proposition,
though it explains neutrality, does not tell us what government can
and cannot do; it leaves unanswered the critical question of what the
proper criteria are. And with respect to that question, neutrality sim235. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (applying equal protection strict scrutiny as
part of establishment analysis).

November 1987]

The ''No Endorsement" Test

331

ply has nothing to say. Neutrality is parasitic upon -- not the parent
of - substantive doctrine.
This assessment illuminates the underlying problem with an establishment jurisprudence dedicated to the ideal of neutrality. The problem is not that the ideal is inapposite or incorrect; the ideal is, on the
contrary, essential. The error is in expecting from neutrality more
than it can deliver. Scholars and judges ought to pay due respect to
the ideal of neutrality - and then recognize that all the hard analytical, interpretive, or historical work remains to be done. If they insist
that the ideal of neutrality do that work for them, the inevitable consequence will be confusion.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND SYMBOLISM AND NEUTRALITY

Blood, it is said, cannot be squeezed out of a stone; but the proverb's continuing active circulation suggests that people persist in trying. Substantive establishment doctrine, similarly, cannot be deduced
from the ideal of neutrality. The ideal is valid but parasitic; it is dependent upon - rather than generative of - substantive criteria or
rules for regulating church-state relations. But neither scholars nor
judges seem ready to give up the attempt - hence the appeal, and the
futility, of Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test. By focusing
upon a law's symbolic effects and the perceptions it creates, the test
seems to derive guidance from the ideal of neutrality while avoiding
the conundrums that have plagued efforts to give substantive content
to that ideal. But the appearance is an illusion - and one which disappears when the test is critically examined. Such an examination
reveals that the "no endorsement" test is riddled with analytical flaws
that can only compound the confusion and inconsistency afflicting
current establishment doctrine.
Thus, adoption of the "no endorsement" test would simply initiate
another era of chaotic results - and ensuing accusations of disingenuousness and doctrinal manipulation. While establishment doctrine undoubtedly needs reexamination, the "no endorsement" test is not the
solution. The test's deficiencies should rather prompt scholars and jurists to explore other doctrinal alternatives, 236 unencumbered by the
illusion that substantive answers can be deduced from the formal idea
236. For instance, efforts to develop a doctrine devoted to preventing governmental coercion
of religious belief and practice, see, e.g., McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Elemellf of Estab/ishmellf, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 933 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Ame11dme11t: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIIT. L. REV. 673 (1980), seem much more promising than
attempts to resolve church-state problems by reference to the formal concept of neutrality.

332

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 86:266

of neutrality, or that doctrinal problems can be avoided by retreating
into symbolism and appearances.

